An Environmental Audit Privilege: What Protection Remains After EPA\u27s Rejection of the Privilege? by DelSole, Ellen Page
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 46 
Issue 2 Winter 1997 Article 2 
1997 
An Environmental Audit Privilege: What Protection Remains After 
EPA's Rejection of the Privilege? 
Ellen Page DelSole 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Ellen P. DelSole, An Environmental Audit Privilege: What Protection Remains After EPA's Rejection of the 
Privilege?, 46 Cath. U. L. Rev. 325 (1997). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol46/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For 
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
ARTICLES
AN ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT PRIVILEGE: WHAT
PROTECTION REMAINS AFTER EPA'S
REJECTION OF THE PRIVILEGE?
Ellen Page DelSole*
As the government imposes broader regulation on industry activities
affecting the environment, companies must assess the extent to which
they can perform environmental audits, internal investigations of envi-
ronmental problems, in order to seek solutions without leaving the infor-
mation they discover open to parties who might have claims against
them.' While environmental audits are recognized as an effective, proac-
tive means to avoid environmental liabilities,2 they also threaten to form
* Ellen Page DelSole is an associate at the law firm of Ropes & Gray in Washington,
D.C. with a practice focusing largely on environmental litigation.
1. The issue of protection for environmental audit materials often arises in the con-
text of environmental compliance audits aimed at evaluating a business's present activities
to assess compliance with environmental laws and regulations. See Richard S. Baron &
Christopher J. Valeriote, Environmental Audits-What Are They and Can the Results be
Kept Confidential?, 73 MIcH. B.J. 1048,1049 (1994). Additionally, internal environmental
audits include what some commentators have referred to as "management audits," which
examine a corporation's systems and procedures to ensure that procedures are in place to
provide an adequate check on environmental compliance. See Paula C. Murray, The Envi-
ronmental Self-Audit Privilege: Growing Movement in the States Nixed by EPA, 24 REAL
EST. L.J. 169, 170 (1995); see also Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg.
25,004, 25,006 (1986) (defining environmental auditing as "systematic, documented, peri-
odic and objective review by regulated entities of facility operations and practices related
to meeting environmental requirements"). The privilege protection for environmental au-
dits discussed in this Article focuses primarily on audits to assess compliance with environ-
mental laws and regulations, "management audits," and other internal investigations.
Environmental audits also may occur, however, in the transactional context, where a com-
pany is evaluating the activities or property of another entity prior to a merger, acquisition,
or real estate purchase. See Baron & Valeriote, supra, at 1048. The same protections may
extend to this latter context depending upon the particular circumstances of the audit and
whether it can be considered an internal self-evaluation within the meaning of the applica-
ble law. See id. at 1048-49 (discussing additional defenses available to parties utilizing
transactional audits in business deals).
2. See Baron & Valeriote, supra note 1, at 1050. Indeed, the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA) touts its environmental enforcement programs as having "contributed
to the dramatic expansion of environmental auditing measured in numerous recent
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a roadmap for environmental prosecution or civil liability.' Absent some
protection to guarantee the confidentiality of environmental audit mater-
ials, industry has good reason for concern that audit results could prove a
valuable weapon for a range of potential claimants. Such claimants in-
clude not only state and federal government agencies, which might assert
claims in the context of either criminal enforcement or civil fines and
cleanup actions, but also private parties and citizens' groups who might
decide to bring suit; such information might also increase success in liti-
gating existing claims.4
This quandary brings decisively to the forefront of industry's concerns
the question whether, and to what extent, a privilege exists to protect
environmental audit materials. In recent years legislators and a few
courts have begun to recognize a privilege for environmental audit mater-
ials. Specifically, a number of states have enacted statutes to protect en-
vironmental audit materials, and still more have bills under
consideration;' comparable federal bills have been introduced in Con-
gress.6 Federal courts for the first time have recognized a privilege for
surveys." Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of
Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706, 66,707 (1995) [hereinafter EPA Final Policy]. The EPA has
further observed that, because of limited agency resources, maximum compliance cannot
be achieved "without active efforts by the regulated community to police themselves." Id.
Moreover, it has been argued that for an environmental audit to be effective in furthering
compliance it cannot be a veiled report designed to do minimal harm if disclosed. See
James T. O'Reilly, Environmental Audit Privileges: The Need for Legislative Recognition,
19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 119, 121 & n.10 (1994) (citing ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, AUDITING PUBLIC MEETINGS (July 27-28, 1994), and noting that speakers from
industry "reiterated that internal candor is essential, and is being diminished by concerns
about disclosures"). Rather, the audit report must be strong, brutally honest, and blunt in
order to convince corporate level managers to invest in environmental upgrading to avoid
potential future civil or criminal action. See id.
3. See Thomas B. Johnston & Charles N. Schilke, State Audit Privilege Laws and
EPA's New Auditing Policy: The Effect on the Decision to Audit, 5 EPA ADMIN. L. REP.
619, 619 (1995); see also Baron & Valeriote, supra note 1, at 1050.
4. In addition to concerns about privilege protection in government civil and criminal
enforcement actions and actions brought by third parties, commentators have observed
that management should be particularly concerned about disclosures by its own employees
acting as whistleblowers and suing as "private attorneys general" under the citizen suit
provisions afforded by several environmental statutes. See James R. Arnold, Disclosure of
Environmental Liabilities to Government Agencies and Third Parties, in THE IMPACT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON REAL ESTATE AND OTHER COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, at
381, 430 (1995) (ALI-ABA Course of Study CA47), available in Westlaw, ALI-ABA
Database.
5. For a summary of bills under consideration, illustrating the vast amount of legisla-
tive activity in this area see generally State Lawmakers Weigh Merits of Environmental
Audit Bills, State Env't Daily (BNA) (Apr. 19, 1996), available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNASED File.
6. See, e.g., S. 582, 104th Cong. (1995) (providing, under federal law, a limited privi-
lege from disclosure of information acquired pursuant to a voluntary environmental self-
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environmental audits in some limited litigation contexts, applying either
the traditional privileges of attorney-client privilege and work product or,
in one case, applying the self-evaluative privilege more recently devel-
oped as part of the common law of privilege. 7 Thus, defendants in envi-
ronmental actions have had access to a viable argument that a privilege
should apply to protect environmental audits in federal and state courts.
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), however, recently endeav-
ored to put a lid on privilege expansion with its announcement of a Final
Policy on self-policing that refused to recognize a privilege for environ-
mental audits.8
This Article discusses the contexts in which there was growing recogni-
tion of an environmental audit privilege, including the scope of that pro-
tection, prior to EPA's policy determination that it would not recognize
such a privilege. Next, this Article addresses EPA's Final Policy, its antic-
ipated effect on industry practices, and its impact on the developing law
of privilege protection for environmental audits. Because of the public
interest in expansion of the privilege in the environmental context to en-
sure confidentiality, which is hoped to further correction of environmen-
tal problems through voluntary self-evaluation,9 EPA's rejection of a
privilege may not spell doom for development of environmental audit
privilege protection. There remains, however, a clear tension between
advocates of privilege for environmental audits who argue that the laws
analysis and, if such information is voluntarily disclosed, limited immunity from penalties);
H.R. 1047, 104th Cong. (1995) (same); S. 2371, 103d Cong. (1994) (providing that environ-
mental audit reports will not be subject to discovery, nor "admitted into evidence in any
civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding before a Federal court or agency").
7. See Martin v. Bally's Park Place Hotel & Casino, 983 F.2d 1252 (3d Cir. 1993)
(work product doctrine); Olen Properties Corp. v. Sheldahl, Inc., 38 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1887 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (attorney-client privilege); Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Tex-
tron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Fla. 1994) (self-evaluative privilege).
8. See EPA Final Policy, supra note 2, at 66,706; see also Cheryl Hogue, State Privi-
lege Legislation Multiplies in 1995; Predictions Differ About 1996, 19 Chem. Reg. Rep.
(BNA) No. 22, at 573, 573-74 (Sept. 1, 1995).
9. See Daniel Riesel & Michael D. Zarin, Environmental Action Program Model, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1297, 1314 (1991). Riesel and Zarin note that the policy reasons courts
have enumerated for application of a self-evaluative privilege are present in the context of
environmental audits:
(1) a corporation is likely to desire that such material be kept confidential, and is
likely to do all that is possible to ensure such confidentiality; (2) corporate assess-
ment of compliance with environmental laws and regulations and actions to en-
sure compliance are in the public interest; and (3) the candor and cooperation
that confidentiality facilitates is necessary to make such self-critical evaluations
efficient and useful.
Id. at 1314 n.51 (citing Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., 50 F.R.D. 249, 250-51 (D.D.C. 1970),
affd without op., 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973)).
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encourage corporate compliance with environmental laws,' ° and oppo-
nents of privilege expansion, such as environmental groups, who argue
that privilege laws jeopardize the important public interest of ensuring
citizens' right to know the identities of community polluters." In light of
this tension, the ideal state of uniformity in environmental audit privilege
laws remains a distant hope. As long as the privilege remains limited to
certain states and scattered federal courts, the potential for privilege pro-
tection to establish its purported goal of encouraging voluntary audits will
remain thwarted because of companies' concerns that their audit materi-
als may be introduced by an adversarial party in a forum where audit
protection does not exist.
I. GROWTH OF ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT PRIVILEGE LAW THROUGH
STATUTORY PROTECTION IN THE STATES
A. Development of State Environmental Audit Privilege Statutes
The number of states enacting environmental audit privilege statutes
has increased substantially since Oregon enacted the first environmental
audit privilege statute in 1993.12 As of the writing of this article, fifteen
states now have environmental audit privilege statutes: 3 Arkansas,' 4
Colorado,' 5 Idaho,16 Illinois, 7 Indiana,' 8 Kansas, 19 Kentucky;20 Michi-
10. Indeed, it has been argued that internal auditing is essential to enable a company
to manage pollution control rather than simply react to crises, and accordingly can be the
best insurance against environmental liabilities. See Murray, supra note 1, at 170-71.
11. See Brian Broderick, State Lawmakers Ask Congress for Relief from EPA Audit
Scrutiny, 19 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 30, at 810 (Oct. 27, 1995).
12. See OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963 (1995); see also infra notes 14-28 and accompanying
text (enumerating the fifteen states that now have environmental audit privilege statutes).
In addition to the legislative activity, several states have addressed environmental audit
issues with administrative policies. For example, California's EPA recently adopted a pol-
icy that mirrors the federal EPA policy. See State Lawmakers Weigh Merits of Environ-
mental Audit Bills, supra note 5.
13. Additionally, several states have enacted penalty reduction or immunity provisions
for violations discovered through an environmental audit but have not provided a privilege
for audit materials. See infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
14. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1-301 to -312 (Michie Supp. 1995).
15. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-25-126.5, 13-90-107 (1987 & Supp. 1996). Section 13-25-
126.5 provides the circumstances under which a company may invoke the privilege. See id.
§ 13-25-126.5. This section operates in conjunction with section 13-90-107(1)(j), added in
1994, which expressly extended a self-evaluative privilege, previously applicable in the
medical context, to include environmental audit reports. See id. § 13-90-107(1)(i).
16. IDAHO CODE §§ 9-801 to -811, 9-340(45) (Supp. 1996).
17. 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/52.2 (West Supp. 1996).
18. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-28-4-1 to -28-4-10 (Michie 1996) (replacing §§ 13-10-1-1 to -
10-4-3).
19. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3332 to -3339 (Supp. 1995).
20. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040 (Michie 1995).
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gan,21 Mississippi,22 New Hampshire,23 Oregon,24 Texas,25 Utah,26 Vir-
ginia,27 and Wyoming.28 Explicitly designed to create privilege
protection for information unearthed through environmental audits,
these statutes, for the most part, do not affect the existing common law
privileges that are recognized in state courts.2 9
The professed goal of these statutes, to further voluntary environmen-
tal compliance by encouraging self-evaluation, is set forth expressly in
several of the statutes. For example, Arkansas's statute contains a pre-
amble defining the purpose of its environmental audit statute:
The General Assembly hereby finds and declares that protec-
tion of the environment is enhanced by the public's voluntary
compliance with environmental laws and that the public will
benefit from incentives to identify and remedy environmental
compliance issues. It is further declared that limited expansion
of the protection against disclosure will encourage such volun-
tary compliance and improve environmental quality and that the
voluntary provisions of this subchapter will not inhibit the exer-
cise of the regulatory authority by those entrusted with protect-
ing our environment.3"
21. 1996 Mich. Legis. Serv. 290, 290-95 (West) (to be codified at MIcH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 324.14801 to 324.14810).
22. MISS. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71 (Supp. 1996).
23. 1996 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. 10, 10-16 (Michie) (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 147-E:1 to -E:9).
24. OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963 (1995).
25. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc (West Supp. 1996).
26. UTAH R. EVID. 508; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-101 to -108 (1995).
27. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1198 to -1199 (Michie Supp. 1995).
28. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105 (Michie Supp. 1996).
29. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(6) (Supp. 1996) ("Nothing in this section lim-
its, waives, or abrogates the scope or nature of any statutory or common-law privilege.");
IND. CODE ANN. § 13-28-4-10 (Michie 1996) (replacing § 13-10-3-12) ("This chapter does
not limit, waive, or abrogate the scope or nature of any statutory or common law privilege,
including the following: (1) The work product doctrine. (2) The attorney client privi-
lege."); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3337 (Supp. 1995); 1996 Mich. Legis. Serv. 290, 294
(West) (to be codified at MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 324.14808); 1996 N.H. Adv. Legis.
Serv. 10, 14 (Michie) (to be codified at N.H. STAT. ANN. § 147-E:7(II)); Utah R. Evid.
508(g).
30. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 8-1-301 (Michie Supp. 1995). Several other statutes contain
similar statements of purpose. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(1); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 468.963(1) (1995).
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In order to prevent abuse of the privilege, the state statutes generally
create exceptions to the privilege.31 Thus, the privilege is often referred
to as a qualified privilege.32
B. Typical Structure of State Environmental Audit Privilege Statutes
Both the language and general structure of many of the statutes are
drawn from Oregon's 1993 statute.33 Most of the state statutes that pro-
vide for an environmental audit privilege follow a similar structure-a
statutory provision creates a privilege and other provisions create certain
limitations and exceptions to the privilege. 34 The privilege statutes, how-
ever, vary in many ways. One of the most significant variations among
the statutes is that while some state statutes contain provisions for pen-
alty immunity or reduction if violations are discovered in an audit and
voluntarily reported, others are limited to an evidentiary privilege.35
Another variation among statutes that provide an environmental audit
privilege is inclusion or exclusion of the privilege in the state's rules of
evidence. Of the states with an environmental audit privilege law, only
Utah includes the privilege as part of its rules of evidence. 36 Utah com-
bines its rule of evidence with statutory sections that extend the privilege
to administrative proceedings and testimony by individuals who partici-
pated in preparation of the environmental audit.
37
In contrast with Utah's rule of evidence, Idaho's statute stands out as
one of the most unique in that it does not expressly establish an eviden-
tiary privilege precluding the admission of an environmental audit into
evidence or allowing knowledgeable persons to refuse to testify about the
content of an environmental audit.38 Instead, section 9-804 of the Idaho
31. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN §§ 8-1-307 to -308; IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-28-4-2 to -28-
4-3; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040(4)(c), (d) (Michie 1995); OR. -REV. STAT.
§ 468.963(3)(b), (c).
32. See O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 141.
33. OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963.
34. Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963(3)(b), (c), with Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 224.01-4040(4)(c), (d).
35. See infra notes 84-111 and accompanying text. Additionally, a few states have
enacted laws that create penalty immunity for violations voluntarily disclosed after an in-
ternal audit, but that do not provide for an evidentiary privilege. See infra note 89.
36. See UTAH R. EVID. 508.
37. Section 19-7-105 of the Utah Code extends the privilege for environmental audit
reports to administrative proceedings, and section 19-7-107 extends the protection in Rule
508 to protect as privileged information held by officers or employees who perform or
assist in preparation of an environmental audit report. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 19-7-105, 19-
7-107 (1995). For a discussion of other state statutes protecting the testimony of persons
preparing an audit see infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
38. See IDAHO CODE § 9-804 (Supp. 1996). Section 9-804 provides that "Notwith-
standing any other provision of law to the contrary, no state of Idaho public official, em-
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Code prohibits state public officials, employees, and environmental agen-
cies from compelling the disclosure of the content of any environmental
audit report.39 Because they are public employees, this provision prohib-
its judges and administrative hearing officers from compelling disclo-
sure.4" Despite such variations in the statutes' language and structure,
however, many of the state statutes accomplish similar results and have
several common elements.
1. The Meaning of Protected Environmental Audit and
Environmental Audit Report
Generally, to be protected, the audit must be the result of voluntary
self-evaluation; therefore, the company must perform the audit in-house
or hire a qualified outside auditor or consultant to perform that duty.4
The statutes usually contain detailed definitions of what constitutes a pro-
tected environmental audit and a protected environmental audit report,
although they vary somewhat in the scope of privileged materials.4a
For example, Utah defines an "environmental audit report" broadly, in
both its rule of evidence and its statutory provision, extending the provi-
sion to administrative proceedings.43 The report encompasses recorded
data in a variety of media, including "any document, information, report,
finding, communication, note, drawing, graph, chart, photograph, survey,
suggestion, or opinion, whether in preliminary, draft, or final form, pre-
ployee or environmental agency shall require to be disclosed an environmental audit
report prepared by or on behalf of any person, except from any governmental entity."
Id.
39. See id.
40. See Katherine B. Crawford, Act Provides Limited Immunity for Environmental
Law Violations, ADVOCATE, at 23-24 (Oct. 1995).
41. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 9-803(3) ("'Environmental audit' means an internal eval-
.uation done pursuant to plan or protocol that is designed to identify and prevent noncom-
pliance and to improve compliance with statutes, regulations, permits, and orders. An
environmental audit may be conducted by an owner or operator or by an independent
contractor."); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3332(a) (Supp. 1995) (providing that an " '[a]udit'
means a voluntary, internal assessment, evaluation or review, not otherwise required by
environmental law, that is performed by the owner or operator, the owner's or operator's
employees, or a qualified auditor and initiated by the owner or operator"); 1996 N.H. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 10, 10-11 (Michie) (defining an auditor as "the person or persons engaged or
designated by the regulated entity to conduct an environmental audit and may include
officers or employees of the regulated entity or independent contractors") (to be codified
at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-E:1(I)); see also infra note 45 and accompanying text
(describing UTAH R. EVID. 508(a)(5)).
42. Compare UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-7-103(2) (extending protection to "any docu-
ment prepared as the result of ... an environmental self-evaluation"), with IND. CODE
ANN. § 13-11-2-69 (Michie 1996) (limiting protection to information contained in the docu-
ment labeled "Environmental Audit Report; Privileged Document").
43. UTAH R. EVID. 508(a)(3); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-7-103(2).
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pared as the result of or in response to an environmental self-evalua-
tion."'44 Utah defines an "environmental self-evaluation" as "a self-
initiated assessment, audit or review not otherwise expressly required by
an environmental law, that is performed to determine whether a person is
in compliance with environmental laws."'45 Thus, the statute protects
only responsive investigations assessing compliance with existing laws,
not prospective collections of information for purposes other than com-
pliance with an existing environmental regulation.
Kentucky's definition of a protected environmental audit sweeps more
broadly than Utah's, extending protection to evaluation of management
systems and, thus, recognizes a wider definition of an environmental au-
dit as a plan designed to ensure compliance on a continuing basis 6.4  Ken-
tucky's statute defines an environmental audit as:
a voluntary, internal and comprehensive evaluation of one (1)
or more facilities or an activity at one (1) or more facilities regu-
lated under this chapter, or federal, regional, or local counter-
parts or extensions thereof, or management systems related to
that facility or activity, that is designed to identify and prevent
noncompliance and to improve compliance with statutory or
regulatory requirements. 7
44. UTAH R. EVID. 508(a)(3); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-7 103(2).
45. UTAH R. EvID. 508(a)(5); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-7-103(4). The Utah Code de-
fines environmental laws as including the requirements of Title 19 of the Utah Code, rules
made under that title, or any rules, orders, permits, licenses, or closure plans issued or
approved by the Department of Environmental Quality, or any other provision or ordi-
nance addressing protection of the environment. See UTAH R. EVID. 508(a)(4).
46. See Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040(i)(a) (Michie 1995).
47. Id. The Idaho Code's definition of an environmental audit, as an internal evalua-
tion prepared pursuant to a plan or protocol, also reflects the concept of an audit as a plan
designed to achieve a goal of compliance. See IDAHO CODE § 9-803(3) (Supp. 1996). Simi-
larly, Indiana's statute defines an environmental audit as "a voluntary, an internal, and a
comprehensive evaluation" of regulated facilities, activities at regulated facilities, or man-
agement systems associated with regulated facilities or activities "that [are] designed to
identify and prevent noncompliance with laws and improve compliance with laws, and that
[are] conducted by an owner or operator of a facility or activity by an employee of the
owner or operator or by an independent contractor." IND. CODE ANN. § 13-11-2-68
(Michie 1996). An "environmental audit report" in turn is the "set of documents prepared
as a result of an environmental audit." Id. § 13-11-2-69. Other statutes have similar defi-
nitional language. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-302 (Michie Supp. 1995); 1996 Mich.
Legis. Serv. 290 (West) (to be codified at MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.14801(a)); 1996
N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. 10, 11 (to be codified at N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-E:1 (IV));
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(a) (Michie Supp. 1996).
An Environmental Audit Privilege
Defining the documents protected under a statutory environmental audit
privilege broadly, the Kentucky statute protects environmental audit re-
ports in a range of forms and media.48
Like Kentucky, Colorado extends its protection to assessment of man-
agement systems-broadly defining an environmental audit report to in-
clude "any document . . . related to and prepared as a result of a
voluntary self-evaluation."49 Colorado, however, adds the explicit re-
quirement that the audit be "done in good faith."" ° The Colorado statute
defines a voluntary self-evaluation as a self-initiated assessment that en-
vironmental laws expressly do not already require.5' Accordingly, docu-
ments that a regulatory agency requires the company to furnish under a
permit or other environmental law are not privileged. 2
Some states also require that protected environmental audit materials
meet certain formalistic criteria, such as labeling the audit report as a
privileged environmental audit or including an audit implementation
plan. For example, Indiana defines the protected environmental audit re-
port as the "set of documents prepared as a result of an environmental
audit and labeled 'Environmental Audit Report; Privileged Docu-
ment."' 53 Although companies can include items developed in the course
of the audit in the report, Indiana's statute appears to limit protection to
the items included in the labeled report.5 4 Providing somewhat broader
protection, Texas extends privilege protection beyond the materials la-
beled "Environmental Audit Report: Privileged Document" to other sup-
porting information collected or developed in connection with the audit,
48. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040(1)(b). Specifically, in Kentucky, docu-
ments protected may include "field notes and records of observations, findings, sugges-
tions, conclusions, drafts, memoranda, drawings, photographs, computer-generated or
electronically recorded information, maps, charts, graphs, and surveys, provided the sup-
porting information is collected or developed for the primary purpose and in the course of
an environmental audit." Id; see also KAN. STAT. AN. § 60-3332(b) (Supp. 1995).
49. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(2)(b) (Supp. 1996)
50. Id.
51. See id. § 13-25-126.5(2)(e).
52. See id. § 13-25-126.5(4); see also 1996 Mich. Legis. Serv. 290, 290-91 (West) (to be
codified as MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.14802); Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71(2)(a)
(Supp. 1996); TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc(8) (West Supp. 1996); UTAH R. EVID.
508(a)(5).
53. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-11-2-69 (Michie 1996); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
3332(b) (requiring the report be labeled "Audit Report: Privileged Document"); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040(1)(b) (requiring the report to be labeled "environmental audit
report: privileged document"); 1996 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. 10, 12 (Michie) (to be codified
at N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147-E:3); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(a)(ii) (Michie Supp.
1996) (requiring the report be labeled "Environmental Audit Report: Privileged
Document").
54. See IND. CODE ANN. § 13-11-2-69.
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but not necessarily part of the labeled report.55 New Hampshire, how-
ever, denies protection to documents prepared outside the context of the
audit report or in the regular course of business, even if the auditor relied
on such documents and included them in the audit report.56
Several states also expressly extend protection beyond the audit report
itself, protecting as privileged testimony regarding matters in the audit by
those persons involved in the audit's preparation.57 In other states, such
as Oregon, it is less clear whether the privilege extends beyond the text of
the audit report itself. In its introductory paragraph, Oregon's statute
provides that "an environmental audit privilege is recognized to protect
the confidentiality of communications relating to such voluntary internal
environmental audits," indicating that the statute protects communica-
tions relating to creation of the audit and the testimony of those perform-
ing it.58 The following paragraphs, however, are limiting in that they
provide the "Environmental Audit Report" shall be privileged and not
admissible as evidence59 and define the Environmental Audit Report as
including only the audit report itself, which may include field notes and
other records of observations; memoranda and documents analyzing the
audit report; and an implementation plan.6°
2. In Camera Review Procedures and Exceptions to the Privilege
As with the one federal court that has recognized a self-evaluative priv-
ilege for self-critical analysis in the environmental context,61 the state
55. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc(4). Article 4447cc(4) allows inclusion of a
wide range of supporting materials within the privileged audit report. See id. While re-
quiring labeling of the audit report to "facilitate identification" of privileged materials, the
provision expressly provides that failure to label a document does not constitute waiver of
the privilege or create a presumption that the privilege does not apply. Id.
56. See 1996 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 13, (§ 147-E:5(I1I)). To prevent companies
from circumventing this exception, section 147-E:7(III) provides that the statute does not
create a privilege for continuous or uninterrupted environmental audits. See id. (§ 147-E:7
(III)). Similarly, Wyoming requires that, once initiated, the environmental audit must be
completed within 180 days. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(a).
57. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-90-107(j)(I)(A) (Supp. 1996); 415 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/52.2(c) (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3333(b); 1996 Mich. Legis.
Serv. 290-91 (West) (to be codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS § 324.14802(4)); 1996 N.H. Adv.
Legis. Serv. at 14 (§ 147-E:8); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-7-107(1) (1995). Section
4447cc(5)(d) of the Texas statute provides that a person can still be called to testify if he or
she "actually observed physical events of violation" apart from the auditing process, even if
he or she participated in the audit, but that person cannot be called to testify about the
auditing process. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc(5)(d).
58. OR. REv. STAT. § 468.963(1) (1995).
59. Id. § 468.963(2)-(4).
60. Id. § 468.963(6)(b).
61. See Reichhold Chems., Inc. v. Textron, Inc., 157 F.R.D. 522, 528 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
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statutes generally provide a procedure for in camera review of an envi-
ronmental audit report sought in discovery.62 Thus, the court is obligated
to perform a confidential review to determine whether the report is one
that falls within the bounds of a protected environmental audit report.
Perhaps recognizing the process of in camera review as part of discovery
proceedings, Utah's Rule of Evidence 508(b) explicitly provides that "the
existence of an environmental audit report, but not its content, is subject
to discovery but is not admissible as evidence in an administrative or judi-
cial proceeding.,
63
a. Exceptions in the Civil Context
The in camera review process operates to minimize the extent the privi-
lege for environmental audits protects bad actors by allowing exceptions
to the privilege where the court makes certain findings during its review.
Oregon's statute, and several modeled after it, provides that in civil or
administrative proceedings the court shall require disclosure of the audit
materials if, after in camera review, it determines that: the information
was not subject to the audit privilege; the privilege was asserted for a
fraudulent end; or the material demonstrated evidence of noncompliance
with environmental laws and efforts to achieve compliance were not
promptly begun and pursued with reasonable diligence.64 Arkansas has a
similar provision that provides some guidance for companies who seek to
avoid the noncompliance exception, specifically providing that, if the
noncompliance at issue is failure to obtain a permit, the facility operator's
effort to comply will be deemed adequate if the operator filed an applica-
tion for the appropriate permit within ninety days of discovery of the
noncompliance. 65 Several states have further limited the privilege by in-
62. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3)(b); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-28-4-2
(Michie 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-7-106. Section 4447cc(7)(d) of the Texas statute
penalizes persons abusing this process, providing for sanctions to be imposed if the court
determines a "person intentionally or knowingly claimed the privilege for unprotected doc-
uments." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc(7)(d).
63. UTAH R. EVID. 508(b); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(8) (providing
that, save the provisions of the statute creating privilege, "existence of the environmental
audit report shall be subject to discovery proceedings"); KAN. STAT. AN § 60-3333(a)
(Supp. 1995) ("An audit report shall be subject to discovery procedures but shall be privi-
leged and shall not be admissible as evidence in any legal action.").
64. See OR. REv. STAT. § 468.963(3)(b); see also 415 ILL. CoMP. ANN. STAT. 5/
52.2(d)(2) (West Supp. 1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-28-4-2; Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. 224.01-
040(4)(c) (Michie 1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c)(ii) (Supp. 1996); cf. KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3334(d)(2) (providing that the privilege is inapplicable if the party asserting it
has failed to implement a management system to ensure compliance with environmental
laws).
65. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-307(b)(1) (Michie Supp. 1995).
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cluding a provision, similar to Colorado's, stating that the privilege is in-
applicable if, after in camera review, the court or administrative law judge
determines that "the information contained in the environmental audit
report demonstrates a clear, present, and impending danger to the public
health or the environment in areas outside of the facility property.
66
Several states also have included limiting provisions which expressly pro-
vide, distinct from the fraudulent purpose exception, that the privilege
does not apply if the audit was commenced after notice of an impending
government investigation.67
b. Exceptions in the Criminal Context
The same exceptions to privilege protection most frequently applicable
in the civil context, namely assertion of privilege for a fraudulent purpose
or failure to promptly institute efforts to correct noncompliance, apply in
the criminal context as well.68 Exceptions for audits demonstrating a
threat to the public health or the environment and for audits commenced
after notice of a government investigation also extend to criminal cases.
69
Most states, however, provide additional, broader protections against
abuse of the environmental audit privilege in the criminal context. For
example, Oregon's statute provides that a prosecuting authority who has
probable cause to believe there has been a violation of environmental
laws (based on a source separate from the environmental audit) can ob-
tain the audit by subpoena or search warrant, and that the court will re-
view it in a private hearing before disclosure.7" Similar procedures are
available to prosecutors under a number of other statutes.71 Generally,
66. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3)(e). Similarly, New Hampshire provides for an
exception to the privilege if the audit report "reveals a threat of imminent or substantial
harm to the public health or the environment." 1996 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. 10, 12 (to be
codified at N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 147-E:4(II1)). Although the New Hampshire provi-
sion does not provide for in camera review to determine whether the exception applies,
presumably such a procedure would be appropriate. See id.; see also Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 49-2-71(1)(d) (Supp. 1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c)(ii)(D).
67. See 1996 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. 10, 12-13 (Michie) (to be codified at N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 147-E:4(IV)(a)(2)); see also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3)(d); UTAH R.
EVID. 508(d)(3).
68. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-308; ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/52.2(d)(2); IND.
CODE ANN. § 13-28-4-3; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-040(d); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 468.963(3)(c).
69. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(3)(d), (e); Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-
71(1)(c), (d); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c)(iii).
70. See OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963(4)(a).
71. See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 8-1-309; ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/52.2(e); IND. CODE
ANN. § 13-28-4-3; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3335(a) (Supp. 1995); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 224.01-040(5)(a); TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc(9) (West Supp. 1996) (applying
a "reasonable cause" standard); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c)(v).
[Vol. 46:325
1997] An Environmental Audit Privilege
the burden falls upon the creator of the audit to request in camera review.
Failure to do so within thirty days waives the privilege.72
In criminal cases, several statutes also include a broad exception to the
privilege similar to the exception to the work-product doctrine in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). These exceptions provide that the priv-
ilege will be inapplicable where the prosecutor has a compelling need for
the information, the information is not otherwise available, and the pros-
ecutor is unable to obtain the substantial equivalent of the information by
other means without unreasonable cost and delay.73 Thus, unlike the civil
context where most states do not recognize a "compelling need" excep-
tion,74 disclosure in the criminal context can be premised on a showing of
compelling need-a criteria unrelated to the company's efforts to identify
and correct its problems. Accordingly, in the criminal context, the com-
72. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3335(b) (providing that the owner or operator has
30 days after the state acquires the audit to request an in camera review). A variation
exists in Michigan in that the facility operator must give notice objecting to the disclosure
to the appropriate law enforcement authority within 30 days, and the law enforcement
authority then petitions the court for in camera review. See 1996 Mich. Legis. Serv. 290,
291-92 (to be codified at MicH. COMP. LAWS § 324.14804). Wyoming also varies from the
norm in providing that the owner or operator must file a petition for in camera review
within 20 days or the privilege is waived. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c)(vi).
73. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (providing that a party may obtain trial prepara-
tion materials if he or she has substantial need of them and is unable to obtain the
equivalent without substantial hardship), with IND. CODE ANN. § 13-28-4-3(2)(D) (includ-
ing as an exception material that "the prosecuting attorney has a compelling need for... is
not otherwise available; and ... the prosecuting attorney is unable to obtain the substantial
equivalent of the information by any means without incurring unreasonable cost and de-
lay"), 1996 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. 10, 12-13 (to be codified at N.H. STAT. ANN. § 147-
E:4(IV)(b)) (providing for an exception to the privilege in criminal proceedings only, if
following an in camera review, "the material shows evidence of the commission of a crimi-
nal offense under an environmental law and the state demonstrates that it has a compelling
need for the information and the information is not otherwise available"), OR. REV. STAT.
§ 468.963(3)(c)(D) (providing an exception for materials relevant to the commission of an
offense, in which the "district attorney or Attorney General has a compelling need for the
information, the information is not otherwise available and the district attorney or Attor-
ney General is unable to obtain the substantial equivalent of the information by means
without incurring unreasonable cost and delay"), Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c)(iii)
(including as an exception to the privilege all or part of a report if the court, in a criminal
proceeding, determines that the information is relevant to the commission of an offense
under state or federal environmental laws, "the district attorney or attorney general has a
need for the information, the information is not otherwise available and the district attor-
ney or attorney general is unable to obtain the substantial equivalent of the information by
any means without incurring unreasonable cost and delay"), and Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 224.01-040(4)(d)(4) (allowing the prosecution to obtain material relevant to the commis-
sion of an offense simply if the prosecutor has a "need for the information," without fur-
ther qualification).
74. Provisions that permit an exception to the privilege upon a showing of compelling
circumstances are the exception to the rule in the civil context. See CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 13-25-126.5(3)(c).
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pany cannot be guaranteed that its efforts to protect against disclosure,
through diligently avoiding fraudulent conduct and assuring prompt com-
pliance with any violations discovered, always will preclude discovery of
its audit materials. Rather, a loophole exists that may lead to disclosure
of audit materials despite all efforts to follow the letter of the rules to
maintain confidentiality. This loophole has the potential to play a sub-
stantial role in furthering environmental enforcement in states with audit
protection laws because it gives the prosecutor a means of obtaining evi-
dence necessary to prosecute environmental infractions by arguing com-
pelling need when the evidence is otherwise lacking.
3. Burden of Proof
The state statutes vary somewhat with regard to who has the burden of
proving whether a privilege should apply. In Colorado, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, and Utah, a person asserting the environmental audit privilege
bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of privilege; the bur-
den then shifts to the person seeking disclosure, who must prove the envi-
ronmental audit report is not privileged.75 Idaho's statute provides that
the entire burden of showing that disclosure is appropriate rests on the
party seeking disclosure.76
In contrast, Texas places the entire burden of establishing the applica-
bility of the privilege on the party asserting the privilege. 77 Under Ore-
gon's statute, the burden of proving that the privilege applies, as well as
the burden of proving that reasonable efforts were taken to correct any
noncompliance discovered by the audit, generally falls on the party seek-
ing the privilege's protection. 78 An exception to the rule in Oregon ex-
ists, however, in that the party seeking disclosure has the burden of
showing that the privilege was asserted for a fraudulent purpose.79 Addi-
tionally, in the criminal context, the prosecutor has the burden of proving
the conditions for disclosure where the prosecutor seeks disclosure under
section 468.963(3)(c)(D), which permits disclosure when the prosecutor
has shown both a compelling need and that the substantial equivalent of
the information contained in the audit is not available by other means.8 0
75. See COLO. REV. STAT. 13-25-126.5(7); 1996 Mich. Legis. Serv. 290, 293 (West) (to
be codified at MICH. Com'. LAWS § 324.14806(1)); Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71(5) (Supp.
1996); UTAH CODE. ANN. § 19-7-106(3),(4) (1995); UTAH R. EVID. 508(f).
76. See IDAHO CODE § 9-806(3) (Supp. 1996).
77. See TEx. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc(5)(f) (West Supp. 1996).
78. See OR. REV. STAT. § 468.963(3)(d).
79. See id.
80. See id. § 468.963(3)(c)(D). Other statutes applying the same allocation of burdens
include IND. CODE ANN. § 13-28-4-4(d) (Michie 1996); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-
040(4)(e) (Michie 1995); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-1105(c)(iv) (Michie Supp. 1996).
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Other states contain modifications of Oregon's rule. For example, Ar-
kansas follows Oregon's approach of generally placing the burden of
proving the privilege, including showing appropriate efforts to achieve
compliance, on the party seeking protection, but placing the burden of
showing that the party seeking protection does so fraudulently, on the
party seeking disclosure.8' In the criminal context, however, Arkansas
shifts the burden to the prosecutor to show that the person claiming the
privilege did not promptly initiate and pursue appropriate efforts to
achieve compliance.82 Since Arkansas's statute does not have a provision
for a prosecutor to obtain audit materials based on compelling need, that
circumstance for shifting the burden to the prosecution does not exist in
Arkansas.
83
4. Penalty Reduction and Immunity
Many state statutes limit the protection provided to the simple exist-
ence of a privilege without more,84 while others provide penalty reduc-
tion or immunity for violations discovered in the context of an
environmental audit.85 Colorado's 1994 statute was the first to provide
protection that operates as a "safe harbor" for immunity from penalties
as part of its privilege protection. 86 Industry representatives and govern-
ment officials in Colorado have characterized this evolution of environ-
mental audit protection statutes as moving beyond merely creating a
privilege as intended to address the dilemma companies face in choosing
between disclosing the audit, and possibly subjecting themselves to sanc-
tions, or attempting to solve the environmental problem on their own.87
Where the statute provides certainty about penalty reduction and immu-
nity, companies can avoid this conundrum. Environmental groups have
81. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 8-1-310 (Michie Supp. 1995).
82. See id. § 8-1-310(c).
83. See id. § 8-1-310; see also 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/52.2(e)(5) (West Supp.
1996) (providing that the party asserting the privilege "has the burden of demonstrating
the applicability of the privilege," but that the burden shifts to the State's Attorney or
Attorney General when the State's Attorney or Attorney General seeks disclosure under
certain exceptions).
84. Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Oregon, and Utah are among the states that
simply provide the privilege, without enhancing the incentives to perform audits by provid-
ing immunity from or mitigation of penalties for violations discovered through environ-
mental audits. See supra notes 14, 17-18, 20, 24, 26.
85. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
86. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-114.5 (Supp. 1996); see also O'Reilly, supra note 2,
at 154-55.
87. See O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 154 & n. 180 (citing Environmental Protection
Agency, Auditing Public Meetings, July 27, 1994 afternoon session, at 20 (statement of
Cynthia Goldman for the Colorado Association of Commerce and Industry)).
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criticized sharply such provisions for immunity and penalty reductions be-
cause they create an avenue for companies to avoid criminal violations
under the shield of an audit."8 Nevertheless, the number of states provid-
ing such immunity provisions, along with their privilege statutes, has
grown to include Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Minne-
sota, New Hampshire, and Texas.89
Under the first of these penalty immunity and reduction statutes, the
Colorado statute, the company may avail itself of a rebuttable presump-
tion of immunity from penalty if it meets the statutory criteria for a "vol-
untary disclosure." 9° Those criteria include requirements that the
company disclose environmental problems promptly, that the disclosures
are the result of voluntary self-evaluation, that the company respond with
adequate efforts to achieve compliance, and that the company cooperate
with the appropriate agency or division.9 The rebuttable presumption of
voluntary disclosure, and therefore of immunity, extends to "any adminis-
trative and civil penalties associated with the issues disclosed" and to
"any criminal penalties for negligent acts associated with the issues dis-
88. See EPA, Threatened with 'E' Group Suits, Adopts Get-Tough Audit-Law Stance,
34 Air/Water Pollution Rep.'s Env't Wk. (Bus. Publishers, Inc.), No. 18, at 270-71 (Apr. 29,
1996) (citing the comments of Sierra Club attorney Ross Vincent).
89. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-1-114.5; IDAHO CODE § 9-809 (Supp. 1996); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-3338 (Supp. 1995); 1996 Mich. Legis. Serv. 290, 294 (West) (to be codified
at MicH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 324.14809); 1996 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 238, 238-239 (West)
(to be codified at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E); Miss. CODE ANN. § 49-2-71 (Supp. 1996);
1996 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. 10, 14-16 (Michie) (to be codified as N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 147-E:9); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc(10) (West Supp. 1996). Notably, while
most of the penalty immunity provisions were enacted as part of the same legislation as the
state's environmental audit privilege law, in other states the two pieces of legislation were
enacted separately. Minnesota recently enacted its penalty immunity provision, but it has
a separate bill for an audit privilege in committee. See S.F. No. 1759 (Minn. 1995), avail-
able in Westlaw, MN-Bills Database. Similarly, South Dakota has enacted a statute pro-
tecting a company from penalties if it voluntarily discloses information discovered through
an environmental audit. See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-40-33 (Michie Supp. 1996). How-
ever, although South Dakota's statute provides that the state's department of environmen-
tal protection cannot request the results of an audit, the environmental audit is subject to
discovery according to the rules of civil and criminal procedure. See id. § 1-40-35. Along
the same lines, New Jersey has enacted legislation that provides limited immunity, but no
privilege protection, for certain voluntary disclosures. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D-130
(West Supp. 1996). The State of Washington also has a policy to grant immunity for viola-
tions discovered through audits. See State Lawmakers Weigh Merits of Environmental Au-
dit Bills, State Env't Daily (BNA) (Apr. 19, 1996), available in Westlaw, BNA-SED
Database or LEXIS, BNA Library, BNASED File.
90. COL. REv. STAT. § 25-1-114.5. In contrast, Texas places the burden on the party
claiming immunity first to establish a prima facie case that the disclosure was voluntary.
See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc(10)(f). The burden then shifts to the enforce-
ment authority to rebut the presumption. See id.
91. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-1-114.5(1)(a)-(d).
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closed ''92 The prosecutor can rebut the presumption only by a showing
that the disclosure was not "voluntary" within the meaning of the statute.
Additionally, an exception exists to the rebuttable presumption when a
person or entity is found to have "committed serious violations that con-
stitute a pattern of continuous or repeated violations of environmental
laws." 93
Michigan's statute has a similar structure, but expressly limits immunity
in that it does not extend immunity to criminal penalties or fines for gross
negligence.94 Michigan's statute also differs in that it expressly provides
that an audit is not voluntary unless it occurs before the entity is made
aware that it is under investigation for potential violations of law.95 How-
ever, Michigan does provide a middle ground where, if the company does
not meet the requirements for voluntary disclosure, but shows a good
faith effort was pursued to voluntarily disclose, the nature and extent of
the good faith effort will be considered in mitigation of penalties.
96
Similarly, Kansas's statute also provides for a rebuttable presumption
of immunity when a person promptly makes a voluntary disclosure of a
violation discovered in an audit to the appropriate regulatory agency.97
The statute conditions immunity on the company's diligent initiation of
efforts to correct the violation and to cooperate with the appropriate
agency.9" A disclosure is not voluntary if state law requires the disclosure
to be reported,99 and a lack of voluntariness is one of several bases for
rebutting a presumption of immunity.' Other bases for rebutting the
presumption include an intentional or willful violation of the law, a fail-
ure to correct a violation in a diligent manner, and a showing that "signif-
icant environmental harm or a public health threat was caused by the
violation."' ' This last basis creates a significant exception allowing pros-
92. Id. § 25-1-114.5(4).
93. Id. § 25-1-114.5(6).
94. See 1996 Mich. Legis. Serv. 290, 294 (West) (to be codified at MICH. COMP. LAws
§ 324.14809(1)).
95. See id. (§ 324.14809(1)(d)).
96. See id. at 295 (§ 324.14809(5)); see also TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
4447cc(10)(e) (West Supp. 1996) (providing for several mitigation factors including "(1)
the voluntariness of the disclosure; (2) efforts by the disclosing party to conduct environ-
mental or health and safety audits; (3) remediation; (4) cooperation with government offi-
cials investigating the disclosed violation; (5) or other relevant considerations").
97. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3338 (Supp. 1995). The entity making the assertion of
voluntary disclosure must make a prima facie showing of voluntariness, and then the op-
posing entity has the burden of rebutting the presumption. Id. § 60-3338(d).
98. See id. § 60-3338(a).
99. See id. § 60-3338(b).
100. See id. § 60-3338(c)(1).
101. Id. § 60-3338(c)(2)-(4).
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ecutors to rebut the presumption of penalty immunity despite a com-
pany's diligent efforts to correct the problem and to cooperate with the
regulatory agency.
New Hampshire's statute places strict time limits on disclosure, waiving
penalties only if the company discloses the violations discovered in the
audits within thirty days, commits to perform remediation within ninety
days, or, if infeasible, within a period approved by the state agency, and
reports to the agency within ten days of completion of the remedial ac-
102tion. Exceptions to immunity exist if a criminal act was committed
knowingly, purposefully, or recklessly; if the company has been the sub-
ject of certain past compliance actions; and if the state discovered the
violation prior to an investigation or disclosure by the company.
10 3
Idaho's statute contains broad language granting penalty protection for
voluntary disclosures. 10 4 It provides that if a party voluntarily discloses
an environmental audit report, in whole or in part, to the appropriate
state agency, the person making the disclosure will not be subject to pen-
alties or incarceration for acts associated with violations revealed by the
audit materials.' 05 Like many other state statutes, Idaho's statute creates
a rebuttable presumption of voluntary disclosure, provided that the dis-
closure was made in a timely manner, is a result of the environmental
audit, and appropriate efforts were made promptly to achieve compli-
ance.' °6 Idaho's statute aims to curtail bad actors in two ways: the immu-
nity does not extend to entities with repeated serious violations of
environmental laws, nor is immunity extended in cases of serious viola-
tions that have been the subject of multiple settlement agreements within
the three years prior to the audit.0 7 Under Idaho's statute, however, im-
munity presumably would not apply if the regulated party does not meet
the statutory requirement of disclosing to the "appropriate" state
102. See 1996 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. 10, 14-15 (Michie) (to be codified at N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 147-E:9(I)). Texas provides an alternative means to ensure timely reporting,
requiring that in order to receive immunity, a facility conducting an environmental audit
must give notice of the plan to commence the audit, the anticipated time it will begin, and
the planned scope of the audit. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc(10)(g) (West
Supp. 1996).
103. See 1996 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 15-16 (§ 147-E:9(II)).
104. See IDAHO CODE § 9-809 (Supp. 1996). Texas's statute is also notably broad in
that it applies not only to voluntary environmental audits, but also to health and safety
audits. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4447cc(10)(b)(4).
105. See IDAHO CODE § 9-809(1). The provision provides that "[a]ny person that
makes a voluntary disclosure" will be "immune from state prosecution, suit or administra-
tive action for any civil or criminal penalties or incarceration for acts associated with the
issues disclosed." Id.
106. See id. § 9-809(2)(a)-(c).
107. See id. § 9-809(6).
[Vol. 46:325
An Environmental Audit Privilege
agency.1"8 In addition, Idaho's statute does not affect a company's ability
to avoid environmental liability required by a consent order or other re-
medial action concerning an "imminent hazard" associated with the dis-
closure.0 9 Thus, the protection from civil or criminal penalties and
criminal prosecution has been interpreted as extending only to the impo-
sition of fines or punishment, and not to orders for remedial action." 0
It must be noted that these penalty immunity statutes create immunity
solely for violations of state environmental law. Accordingly, state envi-
ronmental audit statutes have no bearing on actions by federal agencies
enforcing federal laws. Nevertheless, the EPA has expressed concern
that the breadth of immunity provided by statutes such as Idaho's will
create an impediment to successful federal regulation of the environment,
particularly in those areas where state and federal regulations cross paths
such as where EPA has delegated an area of regulation to the state."'
5. Time Limits on Statutes' Effectiveness
Finally, reflecting the cutting-edge, experimental nature of environ-
mental audit protection statutes, several states have imposed temporal
limits on their environmental audit privilege statutes. For example, New
Hampshire's statute expressly states that the law is to be repealed in 2002
"unless it can be demonstrated to be effective in encouraging enhanced
voluntary compliance with environmental laws, and not in providing op-
portunities for avoidance of such compliance." ' 1 2 New Hampshire's leg-
islature calls for its Department of Environmental Services, in
consultation with other environmental interests to report to the court in
2001.113
108. See id.; see also Crawford, supra note 40, at 23. Ms. Crawford is an Idaho Deputy
Attorney General. See id. at 25.
109. IDAHO CODE § 9-809(7).
110. See Crawford, supra note 40, at 23 (citing IDAHO CODE §§ 9-809(6)-(7)).
111. See infra notes 244-66, and accompanying text (discussing the effect of EPA's Final
Policy on state audit privilege laws, actions taken by the EPA in regions with state privilege
laws, and efforts by the EPA to discourage additional state legislation). The circumstance
where EPA has delegated regulatory authority to a state raises an interesting question of
whether state-law penalty immunity applies when the federal government then steps back
in to bring an enforcement action.
112. 1996 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. 10, 16 (Michie) (to be codified at N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 4:3). Similarly, Colorado's statute "applies only to all voluntary self-evaluations
that are performed during the period beginning June 1, 1994 and ending June 30, 1999."
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-126.5(9) (Supp. 1996).
113. See N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. at 16 (§ 4:3).
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C. Impact of the State Privilege Statutes
Comments are mixed regarding the effectiveness of these state environ-
mental audit privilege laws in accomplishing their expressed goal of fur-
thering voluntary compliance. In Colorado, reports have shown that
more audits have been conducted. 114 Similarly, reports on Texas's statute
indicate an increase in the number of companies conducting audits.
115
In contrast, reports at a seminar on Oregon's statute have demon-
strated that Oregon's statute did not appear to have increased the
number of companies performing audits. 1 6 These distinctions may indi-
cate that the penalty immunity laws are more effective than the simple
privilege protection laws. The lack of uniformity due to the absence of
any statutory federal privilege, however, leaves it unclear whether Ore-
gon's law would be more effective if the privilege extended to every fo-
rum. The lack of federal privilege protection gives companies good
reason not to attempt new audit efforts simply because states have cre-
ated some local protection. Nonetheless, it seems likely that the privilege
laws, even without penalty immunity, further at least some increase in
voluntary audits. Because of the local nature of the state legislative privi-
lege initiatives, locally-based, small and medium sized companies are
most likely to be encouraged by the state privilege statutes to perform
audits, and at least one commentator has observed that those are pre-
cisely the entities most likely not to be-conducting audits in the absence
of a privilege out "of fear [that] what they find may be used against
them.
, 117
114. See Susan Bruninga, Benefit of More Audits Would Offset Intentional Violations,
Bill Supporters Say, 19 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 14, at 374 (July 7, 1995). Testifying
before Congress on a proposed parallel federal law, Cynthia Leap Goldman of the Colo-
rado Association of Commerce and Industry reported that "'Colorado companies are con-
ducting more audits and are more thorough."' Id.
115. See Immunity, Privilege Law Reveals Violations That State Would Not Detect, Offi-
cials Say, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 50, at 2436 (Apr. 26, 1996) (noting that approximately
165 firms notified the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission of their plans to
perform environmental audits and that 20 provided the Commission with their results).
116. See Effects of State's Audit Privilege Law Still Unclear After First Year, Lawyers
Say, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) No. 33, at 1621 (Dec. 16, 1994) (reporting on the comments of
Portland, Oregon attorney Lynne Perry at the annual Hazardous Waste Law and Manage-
ment Conference, co-sponsored by the Northwestern School of Law at Lewis & Clark
College and Region X of the Environmental Protection Agency on December 8 and 9,
1994). The report indicated, however, that Oregon's audit privilege law had influenced
how companies organized their audits and raised awareness of audit programs generally.
See id.
117. Murray, supra note 1, at 173.
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II. CONSIDERATION OF A FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AUDIT PRIVILEGE
In light of both the growth of an environmental audit privilege in the
states, and the continuing disapproval of such developments from the
EPA, both industry and state lawmakers have urged Congress to enact a
federal statute to protect environmental audit materials. Among the bills
under consideration in Congress is one proposed in February 1995 by
Representative Joel Hefley, a Republican from Colorado, entitled the
Voluntary Environmental Self-Evaluation Act.118 The bill, H.R. 1047,
would create a privilege to shield corporate audits from disclosure in both
judicial and administrative proceedings. 119 More specifically, the pro-
posed legislation states that an environmental audit that is voluntary and
made in good faith will be inadmissible evidence in a legal action or ad-
ministrative procedure pursued under federal environmental law.1
2 0
Privilege protection under H.R. 1047 also would extend to the testimony
of persons who conducted the environmental audit.12 ' Like the state stat-
utes, the bill creates exceptions to the privilege and calls for an in camera
review process to evaluate whether an exception applies.12 2 Exceptions
include compelling circumstances justifying disclosure, failure to take ad-
equate steps toward compliance, fraudulent use of the privilege, or prepa-
ration of the audit report for the purpose of avoiding disclosures in a
government investigation. 2 3 Additionally, H.R. 1047 creates a rebutta-
ble presumption of voluntary disclosure that immunizes the company
from all administrative, civil, or criminal penalties for violations volunta-
rily disclosed as a result of an audit.1
2 4
Senator Mark Hatfield of Oregon also has introduced two Senate bills
providing for an environmental audit privilege. In 1994, Senator Hatfield
introduced S. 2371 providing for a federal environmental audit privilege
118. H.R. 1047, 104th Cong. (1995). Alternately, supporters of state audit privilege
laws have sought relief by seeking a rider on the EPA fiscal 1996 appropriations bill, H.R.
2099. See Broderick, supra note 11, at 811. Such a rider would prevent the EPA from an
action against a facility found in a state with an audit privilege statute where the violations
were appropriately reported as a result of an environmental audit. See id.
119. Voluntary Environmental Self-Evaluation Act, H.R. 1047, 104th Cong. § 4(a)
(1995).
120. Id. The term "Federal environmental law" is defined in section 3 of the bill which
includes several federal statutory programs such as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980. See id. § 3(4).
121. Id. § 5.
122. Id. § 4(a)(2).
123. Id.
124. Id. § 6(c).
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loosely modeled on Oregon's statute.'2 5 Although similar to the House
bill in that it provided privilege protection, S. 2371 did not extend to pen-
alty immunity provisions. Nearly a year later, however, Senator Hatfield
introduced a second bill, S. 582, that more closely models the structure of
H.R. 1047 in providing protection for voluntarily prepared environmental
audit reports and testimony of the persons preparing the audit, as well as
penalty immunity for voluntary disclosures and a rebuttable presumption
of voluntariness. 126 Both H.R. 1047 and S. 582 were in committee as of
the time of this writing.
Proponents of a federal environmental audit privilege law argue, as
have proponents of such bills in the states, that existence of such a privi-
lege and penalty immunity for voluntary disclosure will encourage volun-
tary environmental law compliance by encouraging voluntary auditing.
In the federal arena, these proponents have pointed to statistics in the
states as proof of the success of such statutes. For example, a Texas
lawmaker reported that since enactment of Texas's audit privilege statute,
more than a hundred companies have volunteered to conduct audits and
that, due to the complexity of environmental laws, "companies 'typically'
are out of compliance without knowing it.'1 27 Similarly, a Mississippi
representative reported that the state's privilege law caused a large
number of companies to come forward with audit results, therefore, pro-
moting a cleaner environment.
12 8
In contrast, critics of the proposed federal legislation, who include en-
vironmentalists, proponents of consumer rights, and officials at the EPA
and the Department of Justice, have argued that the privilege and penalty
immunity provisions proposed in H.R. 1047 would make enforcement by
regulatory agencies and civil action by citizens' groups too difficult. 1 29 As
the Environmental Defense Fund stated in a press release, environmen-
talists remain concerned that the privilege provisions "'would allow com-
panies to cloak in secrecy many of their routine environmental audits and
thus preclude government and public access to the information.
' "1 30
Moreover, EPA expressed concern that the bill would allow gross negli-
125. S. 2371, 103d Cong. (1994); 140 CONG. REc. S10,942-44 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1994)
(text of S. 2371 and remarks of Senator Hatfield on the bill).
126. S. 582, 104th Cong. (1994); 141 CONG. REC. S4262 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (state-
ment of Senator Hatfield introducing S. 582).
127. Broderick, supra note 11, at 810 (reporting remarks of Republican Texas State
Representative Warren Chisum).
128. See id. (quoting remarks of Republican Mississippi State Senator Mike Gunn).
129. See Bruninga, supra note 114, at 374.
130. Id. (quoting an Environmental Defense Fund press release).
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gence to go unpunished as long as the company disclosed its violations
"voluntarily.",131
Critics have also complained that the bill does nothing to prevent abuse
of the law for short term profit, noting that some companies will recog-
nize that they can profit significantly from even a limited time of opera-
tions that are not in compliance with environmental regulations.
Representative Jack Reed, a Democrat from Rhode Island, voiced con-
cern that limits on fines and penalties could allow a company to deliber-
ately engage in short term criminal conduct, undertake an audit to reveal
the action, take corrective steps, and thus be immunized. 3 ' Similarly,
Steven Herman, EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, noted
that the bill "'glosses over the significant economic benefit the companies
receive while they're not in compliance with the law."" 3 3
Thus far, no clear solution to concerns about abuse of an environmen-
tal audit privilege and penalty immunity law has been reached. Even an
industry group, gathered to respond to criticisms of the federal legislation
and propose improvements to H.R. 1047, agreed that "bad actors" should
not be protected and that companies exhibiting patterns of non-compli-
ance should be excluded from protection.13 4 The group, however, found
it difficult to craft a provision that accurately defines such a pattern.
135
The only solution may be for Congress to follow the pattern of the states
and enact short term legislation that can be repealed if companies' behav-
ior proves that abuse of the statute outweighs its benefits. 36 Current sta-
tistics, however, cannot present an accurate picture of how federal audit
protection laws would fare because it is not possible to assess accurately
how many companies would voluntarily conduct audits until uniformity
of law protects those audit results from all enforcement officials, includ-
ing federal officials. An alternative solution that might minimize abuses
would be to limit environmental audit protection to the creation of a priv-
ilege without penalty immunity, as did Senator Hatfield's original bill and
131. More States Adopt Audit Privilege Laws; EPA Calls Federal Legislation Ill-Ad-
vised, 25 Env't. Rep. (BNA) No. 44, at 2186 (Mar. 10, 1995).
132. See Bruninga, supra note 114, at 374.
133. Id. (quoting statements of Herman at a hearing before House Subcommittee on
Commercial and Administrative Law on June 29, 1995).
134. Industry, Environmentalists Seek Deal on Alternative Compliance Bill, 16 Inside
EPA Wkly. Rep., No. 37, at 11-12 (Sept. 15, 1995).
135. See id. at 12 (observing that the group had not yet finalized its recommendations
to Congress).
136. See IDAHO CODE § 9-809 (Supp. 1996) (providing that the statute be null and void
after December 31, 1997); supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text (discussing state stat-
utes that have created time limits on the statute's effectiveness).
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several state statutes. 137 Based on the current trend toward more expan-
sive protection, embodied in Senator Hatfield's second bill, however,
such a restriction appears unlikely. Rather, as work is ongoing to make
revisions to last year's audit bills, it seems likely that revised bills offering
broader protection to industry will emerge from committee.
138
III. PROTECTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT MATERIALS IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS AS A MATTER OF JUDICIALLY
DEVELOPED PRIVILEGE LAW
In the absence of a federal statute creating an environmental audit
privilege, a second avenue for audit protection is developing in the fed-
eral courts.' 39 Such protection is not widely recognized by any means,
but rather has been utilized successfully in only a few isolated cases. Two
theories exist for audit protection: (1) protection under traditional attor-
ney-client privilege and work product theories, and (2) protection under
the developing self-evaluative privilege.' 4 °
137. See supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text (describing S. 2371 and S. 582).
138. See House Continues Work on Audit Legislation With Eye Towards 1997, 17 Inside
EPA Wkly. Rep., No. 10, at 15-16 (Mar. 8, 1996) (noting that the revisions are aimed at
several issues states and industry sources raised).
139. Although many state legislatures have developed statutory privilege protection for
audits, state courts have not followed suit, rejecting the theories for privilege protection for
audits that have developed in the federal courts. See, e.g., Combined Communications
Corp. v. Public Serv. Co., 865 P.2d 893, 898 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (emphasizing the limited
scope of the self-critical analysis privilege and observing that the unanimous Supreme
Court decision in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) "damp-
ened" the "impetus toward recognition of any such privilege"); Artesian Water Co. v. New
Castle County, No. C.A. 5106,1981 WL 15606, at *3-4 (Del. Ch. Apr. 9, 1981) (finding that
Delaware generally has not recognized a self-evaluative privilege, and that, even if it had,
the court would not apply such a privilege to documents created by panel of experts that
included representatives of several governmental agencies); Kansas Gas & Elec. v. Eye,
789 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Kan. 1990) (applying a balancing test to determine whether the privi-
lege applied and concluding that the injury likely to be caused by disclosure was out-
weighed by the benefits to be gained, including "correct disposal of the litigation"); CPC
Int'l v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 620 A.2d 462, 467 (N.J. 1992) (holding that the
public need for disclosure of documents regarding environmental pollution outweighed the
need for confidentiality, but recognizing that the self-critical analysis privilege may apply in
other contexts, as when the public need for confidentiality outweighs the public need for
disclosure); Ohio ex rel. Celebrezze v. CECOS Int'l, 583 N.E.2d 1118,1121 (Ohio Ct. App.
1990) (holding that heavy regulation and public scrutiny of the hazardous waste industry
created obligations that could not be avoided by invoking the self-evaluative privilege).
140. Where a federal court is not disposed toward finding that a privilege exists under
either of these two theories, a party may still be able to seek privilege protection in federal
court based on state statutes if a state law claim is involved. A federal court sitting in
diversity generally will recognize state-law privilege claims. See O'Reilly, supra note 2, at
139 (citing Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), for the proposition that a federal judge
should recognize a state privilege in cases that arise out of local claims but where federal
court status arises out of diversity jurisdiction). In addition, a state privilege would have
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A. Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work-Product Doctrine
In Olen Properties Corp. v. Sheldahl, Inc. ,"' a magistrate in the Cen-
tral District of California ruled that the attorney-client privilege pro-
tected environmental audit memoranda prepared by company personnel
to assist the company's attorneys in evaluating its compliance with envi-
ronmental laws and regulations.' 42 Denying a motion to compel produc-
tion of audit documents, the court held that the defendant company
communicated confidential information to its attorneys to secure legal
advice, and therefore its communications were protected by the attorney-
client privilege.' 43 In reaching its conclusion, the court held the defend-
ant had the burden of establishing that the privilege applied.1 44 In deter-
mining that the privilege did apply, the court cited a declaration from the
employee who prepared the audit materials stating that he did so "to as-
sist the attorneys in evaluating compliance with relevant laws and regula-
tions.' ' 145 Evaluating this declaration, the court concluded that "[t]he
reports appear to have been prepared for the purpose of securing an
opinion of law.' 146 Thus, the court concluded that the materials satisfied
the requirements of the attorney-client privilege.
147
Similarly, in Martin v. Bally's Park Place Hotel & Casino,48 the Third
Circuit upheld a privilege protecting a consultant's report prepared for
internal evaluation of the source of an employee's chemical exposure.' 49
In opposing the application of privilege, the Secretary of Labor high-
persuasive value in federal question cases, particularly where there are pendent state law
claims. See id. at 152. But see infra notes 183-200 and accompanying text (discussing the
exception to the self-evaluative privilege when a government agency seeks documents).
141. 38 Envtl. Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1887 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
142. See id. at 1888.
143. See id.
144. See id. (citing In re Grand Jury Investigation, 974 F.2d 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 1992)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See id. The Olen court relied on the requirements for the privilege set out in
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). These
requirements include:
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the
person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar of a
court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication is acting
as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was
informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the pur-
pose of securing primarily (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assist-
ance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime
or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the
client.
United Shoe, 89 F. Supp. at 358-59.
148. 983 F.2d 1252 (3d Cir. 1993).
149. See id. at 1254.
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lighted that the consultant's inquiry occurred prior to commencement of
litigation. 5 ' Nonetheless, the court held that the consultant's report was
protected work product based on the fact that the attorney ordering prep-
aration of the report had a "unilateral belief" that litigation would re-
sult.151 As grounds for its ruling, however, the Third Circuit clearly
stated that it would recognize the privilege only in cases like the one at
hand, in which there was a reasonable prospect of litigation. 152 The court
further distinguished routine exposure records from the report at issue in
this case, where an attorney had commissioned a report when already
aware of an employee's complaint to the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA).
153
Thus, when environmental audits are prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion or under the direction of a lawyer for the purpose of seeking legal
advice, the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine may pro-
tect the audit materials. 54 In many circumstances, however, as is illus-
trated by the narrowness of the Martin court's holding, it is quite possible
that courts will find that the conditions under which the audit was made
warrant a finding that the attorney's involvement was for routine business
or investigative purposes, rather than in preparation for litigation.
55
Moreover, use of outside law firms to conduct audits in order to obtain
privilege protection often results in a much less efficient and effective
auditing process.156 Using an outside law firm not only is expensive,157
but it also requires relaying the message about environmental problems
from the technical consultant through the lawyer to management.15 8 The
message may be muffled by the layers of translation and arguably may be
less effective than if technical staff within the company were making their
argument directly to management.
1 59
150. See id. at 1257.
151. Id. at 1260.
152. See id.
153. Id. at 1254, 1261.
154. See id. at 1261 (protecting an OSHA report prepared in anticipation of litigation).
155. See id. at 1260.
156. See 140 CONG. REc. S10,943 (daily ed. Aug. 8, 1994) (remarks of Senator Hatfield
regarding S. 2371, noting that, in Oregon, the environmental audit privilege protection
statute has "reduced the cost of auditing and has created a better flow of information with
companies").
157. See id. By eliminating the need to hire an attorney to seek the privilege, the Ore-
gon statute has provided the additional benefit of cutting lawyers out of the process, there-
fore, reducing the cost of environmental auditing to companies. See id.
158. See O'Reilly, supra note 2, at 136.
159. See id. at 136-37 (noting that "[r]outine auditing produces the best results," but
that the need to hire lawyers to perform even routine audits will discourage routine
auditing).
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Thus, frequently, an attempt to use the traditional protection of the
attorney-client privilege and the work-product doctrine as a shoehorn for
the environmental audit privilege is impractical. 16° Under these circum-
stances, the developing law of self-evaluative privilege may be an alterna-
tive for a company conducting routine internal investigations when no
pre-existing conflict or request for legal advice stems the investigation.
B. The Self-Evaluative Privilege as Protection for Audit Materials
The second theory for applying the privilege in the context of federal
litigation derives from the self-evaluative privilege which, in some cases,
has been recognized to protect a company's confidential, self-evaluative
investigations in circumstances where doing so would encourage an in-
quiry that serves the public interest.
1. Background of the Self-Evaluative Privilege
The possibilities for this fledgling privilege stem from the breadth of
Federal Rule of Evidence 501,161 which as enacted does not include the
several specified categories of privilege that Congress originally contem-
plated, but rather provides simply that the privileges found in the com-
mon law, as interpreted by the courts of the United States, are to
govern.162 The congressional judgment not to explicitly incorporate the
nine common-law privileges recommended by the Advisory Committee
and the United States Supreme Court suggests that Congress intended
the privilege doctrine to be "fluid rather than static and that courts not
160. See Binks Mfg. Co. v. Nat'l Presto Indus., 709 F.2d 1109, 1120 (7th Cir. 1983)
(holding that despite the "remote prospect of future litigation," the defendant nonetheless
must bear the burden of proving that the materials were prepared in anticipation of litiga-
tion); United States v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., Civ. A. No. 88-6681, 1989 WL 121616, at *5-6
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 16,1989) (holding that the attorney-client privilege was inapplicable to audit
reports because, although counsel was involved in the audit process, the communications
sought to be protected were made for business, not legal, purposes); see also James F.
Flanagan, Rejecting a General Privilege for Self-Critical Analyses, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
551, 567 (1983) (noting that protection under traditional doctrines of work-product and
attorney-client privilege may fail "if counsel has been retained for his investigative skill
rather than his legal acumen"); Richard S. Pabst, The Corporate Dilemma: Is it Possible to
Preserve a Privilege for Environmental Audits?, 41 LA. B.J. 110, 111-12 (1993) (describing
the difficulty of fitting an environmental audit within the attorney-client privilege or the
work-product doctrine).
161. FED. R. EVID. 501.
162. See Carol Ann Humiston, Paved with Good Intentions: The Use of Internal Evalua-
tions of Law Enforcement Agencies in Civil Lawsuits, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 364, 367 (1994)
(quoting Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1084-85
(1983)).
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feel unduly constrained in developing previously unrecognized
privileges. "163
a. The Self-Evaluative Privilege Began in the Medical Malpractice
Context
The courts' recognition of a self-evaluative privilege, also known as the
self-critical analysis privilege, finds its roots in the context of medical mal-
practice in Bredice v. Doctor's Hospital, Inc. 164 In Bredice, the court held
that a hospital's "peer review" committee reports were not discoverable
in a medical malpractice suit because of the strong public interest in hos-
pitals being able to engage in ongoing, confidential self-analysis to im-
prove the care offered to patients. 165  The court observed that the
effective functioning of these committees required confidentiality,
166
Hospital staff members could not make candid constructive criticisms if
those criticisms would be made available in discovery and later twisted by
the opposing party into denunciation of a doctor's methods in a malprac-
tice suit.' 67 Accordingly, the court concluded that the public interest in
furthering improved hospital care by confidential self-analysis out-
weighed the need for disclosure of such information absent extraordinary
circumstances. 168 The Bredice court relied on three criteria in reasoning
that the privilege should apply: the materials were (1) kept confidential;
(2) evaluative; and (3) germane to an inquiry that was in the public's in-
terest.'69 These elements subsequently have become the guidepost for
application of the privilege in other areas.
1 70
163. Id. at 367. But see University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (holding
that the federal courts' authority under Federal Rule of Evidence 501 to recognize privi-
leges not generally recognized by the common law or created by statute should not be
exercised "expansively").
164. 50 F.R.D. 249, 250-51 (D.D.C. 1970), affd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
165. See id. at 250.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 251.
169. See id. at 250-51.
170. See Ronald J. Allen & Cynthia M. Hazelwood, Preserving the Confidentiality of
Internal Corporate Investigations, 12 J. CORP. L. 355, 359-60 (1987).
In one of the first cases to expand the privilege beyond the medical peer review field, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia refused to allow plaintiffs
to review reports the defendant's research team prepared because the reports included
candid self-analysis and evaluation of the employer's actions. Banks v. Lockheed-Georgia
Co., 53 F.R.D. 283, 284-85 (N.D. Ga. 1971). The court concluded that disclosure of such
confidential reports would discourage candid self-criticism and evaluation in affirmative
action plans, and thus would be contrary to public policy. See id. at 285. More recently, in
Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 91 Civ. 0035, 1993 WL 362380 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16,
1993), the court recognized a common-law privilege for self-critical analysis where " 'an
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b. The Self-Evaluative Privilege Has Remained Ill-Defined in the
Federal Courts with Courts Advocating Case-by-Case
Determination
Since Bredice, the self-evaluative privilege has gained acceptance in the
medical malpractice context. 171 In some other contexts, courts have rec-
ognized that a qualified privilege exists for various kinds of confidential
self-evaluation by institutions performing functions essential to the public
health or safety. 172  The policy underlying the self-evaluative privilege in
both medical and non-medical contexts is to serve the public interest by
preventing a" 'chilling' effect on self-analysis" and by promoting "candid
and frank self-evaluation.' 73 The courts have applied the privilege on a
case-by-case basis, pursuant to which self-evaluative summaries generally
are not discoverable unless "exceptional circumstances" warrant
discovery.'
74
intrusion into the self-evaluative analyses of an institution would have an adverse effect on
the [evaluative] process, with a net detriment to a cognizable public interest.' " Id. at *1
(quoting Cobb v. Rockefeller Univ., No. 90 CIV. 6516, 1991 WL 222125, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 24, 1991)). The court protected a consulting firm's reports prepared to investigate the
equal employment of women. See id. at *1; see also Granger v. National R.R. Passenger
Corp., 116 F.R.D. 507, 508-510 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (applying the self-critical analysis privilege
to evaluative portions of a railroad accident investigative report); In re LTV Sec. Litig., 89
F.R.D. 595, 621-22 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (protecting as privileged the internal investigations of
a special officer appointed by a company to implement a consent decree with the Securities
Exchange Commission); Rosario v. New York Times Co., 84 F.R.D 626, 631 (S.D.N.Y.
1979) (holding that the self-evaluative privilege protects an employer's self-evaluative
materials regarding affirmative action).
171. In addition, most of the states have statutorily protected medical peer reviews. See
David P. Leonard, Codifying a Privilege For Self-Critical Analysis, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
113, 119 n.25 (1988) (stating that only Maryland and Oregon lack statutes providing civil
immunity or privilege protection for medical peer review proceedings).
172. See, e.g., In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197, 205-06 (E.D.N.Y. 1992)
(upholding a magistrate's application of the privilege to protect an internal review con-
ducted by an accounting firm, but observing that to determine whether the privilege ap-
plies, the court must balance the interest in confidential self-analysis against the need for
discovery); Aleman v. Bonnstetter, No. 89 C 2480, 1991 WL 32757, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6,
1991) (recognizing that a qualified privilege exists for confidential evaluations by institu-
tions performing a function essential to health and safety, and holding that this privilege
protected police records concerning the need for psychological treatment of officers al-
leged to have used excessive force (citing Urseth v. City of Dayton, 653 F. Supp. 1057, 1059
(S.D. Ohio 1986))); see also supra note 170 and accompanying text.
173. Mary Ellen Kris & Gail L. Vannelli, Today's Criminal Environmental Enforcement
Program: Why You May be Vulnerable and Why You Should Guard Against Prosecution
Through an Environmental Audit, 16 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 227, 248 (1991) (quoting Ed-
mund B. Frost & Stephanie Siegel, Environmental Audits: How to Protect Them From Dis-
closure, 5 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) No. 38, 1211, at 1214 (Feb. 27, 1991)).
174. See id. at 248; see also United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 367 (1980) (discuss-
ing the legislative history of congressional intent of Federal Rule of Evidence 501); Tram-
mel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (stating that the congressional intent for
1997]
354 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 46:325
In contexts other than the medical malpractice setting, however, nu-
merous courts have questioned the privilege,' 75 frequently relying on
United States v. Nixon,'17 6 in which the Supreme Court observed that priv-
ileges are not to be "lightly created nor expansively construed.'
177
Nonetheless, most frequently, rather than explicitly denouncing the self-
evaluative privilege, courts that have been hesitant to apply the privilege
simply have found that the privilege is not applicable in the circumstances
at issue without rejecting the privilege itself. For example, in Dowling v.
American Hawaii Cruises, Inc. 178 the Ninth Circuit noted that the
Supreme Court and the circuit courts have not "definitively denied the
existence" of the privilege, though they have not accepted nor defined its
scope either. 179 Rather, they have simply refused to apply the privilege,
relying on narrow distinctions 8 ° regarding the policies that recognition of
enacting Federal Rule of Evidence 501 "was to 'provide the courts with flexibility to de-
velop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis' ") (quoting 120 CONG. REC. H40,891 (daily
ed. Dec. 18, 1974) (statement of Representative Hungate)).
175. See University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990) (holding that the privilege
does not apply to peer review materials in a discrimination case); Gray v. Board of Higher
Educ., 692 F.2d 901, 908 (2d Cir. 1982) (refusing to apply the privilege to information
regarding a tenure committee's votes in an academic tenure determination); Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663, 667 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that equal opportunity
reports, compiled and submitted by a private company to a government agency in compli-
ance with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, are not protected by the privilege);
Etienne v. Mitre Corp., 146 F.R.D. 145, 148 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that the privilege
does not apply to results of an employer's studies regarding its compliance with equal em-
ployment opportunity laws in the context of an employment discrimination suit); In re
Salomon Inc. Sec. Litig., [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 97,254
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1992) (recognizing the privilege, but finding it inapplicable to preclude
production of management control and internal audit studies); Martin v. Potomac Elec.
Power Co., 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 355, at 360-61 (D.D.C. May 25, 1990) (address-
ing solely the issue of whether the self-critical analysis privilege applies to documents in an
employment discrimination case and ultimately denying protection); Skibo v. City of New
York, 109 F.R.D. 58, 63-64 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (disallowing the privilege with respect to docu-
ments created in the context of an internal police investigation); Westmoreland v. CBS,
Inc., 97 F.R.D. 703, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding a news bureau may not invoke the privi-
lege when bureau has not treated an internal self-analysis as confidential and has made
public statements citing to the report).
176. 418 U.S. 683 (1974); see Robinson v. Magovern, 83 F.R.D. 79, 86 (W.D. Pa. 1979)
(citing United States v. Nixon for the proposition that the self-evaluative privilege is disfa-
vored when other values are at stake).
177. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710.
178. 971 F.2d 423 (9th Cir. 1992).
179. Id. at 425 n.1 (citing University of Pa., 493 U.S. at 188-95).
180. See id. at 427 (rejecting the self-evaluative privilege with respect to "routine pre-
accident safety reviews," despite existence of a privilege with respect to "post-accident
investigations"). Similarly, in Coates v. Johnson & Johnson, 756 F.2d 524, 551 (7th Cir.
1985), the court noted, in the context of a racial discrimination action, "[tihe prevailing
view is that self-critical portions of affirmative action plans are privileged and not subject
to discovery." Id. The court stated that the privilege's bounds must be determined on a
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the privilege will serve under the circumstances. The Ninth Circuit fol-
lowed suit, declining to apply the privilege to the voluntary, routine safety
reviews that were at issue in Dowling. 8' The Ninth Circuit refused to
rule expressly on whether and to what extent a self-evaluative privilege
exists.182 Thus, the viability of the self-evaluative privilege remained
open to question.
Additionally, a number of courts that have addressed the privilege
have restricted its scope, finding that the self-evaluative privilege does
not protect documents sought by the government for the purpose of en-
forcing regulations. In Federal Trade Commission v. TRW, Inc.,183 the
District of Columbia Circuit adopted an exception to the self-evaluative
privilege when the government is the party seeking disclosure of docu-
ments. " In TRW, pursuant to the authority granted to it by the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) initiated an
investigation of TRW in response to consumer complaints and issued a
case-by-case basis, however, and avoided deciding the applicability of the privilege in the
case at hand, finding that the defendants' voluntary use of their affirmative action plans to
prove nondiscrimination had waived whatever privilege may have existed. See id. at 552;
see also University of Pa., 493 U.S. at 188, 194-95 (declining to create a privilege to protect
peer review materials relevant to discrimination charges in tenure decision from the
EEOC, and focusing on the policy ramifications of recognizing a privilege in this instance,
rather than on the existence or non-existence of the privilege itself); In re Burlington
Northern, Inc., 679 F.2d 762, 767 (8th Cir. 1982) (refusing to grant audit of mandamus
when the district court judge held that employees' deposition answers were not subject to
the self-critical analysis privilege in an employment discrimination case on grounds that the
circumstances were unextraordinary); Memorial Hosp. v. Shadur, 664 F.2d 1058, 1062-63
(7th Cir. 1981) (refusing to apply the privilege to peer review materials in a doctor's anti-
trust action against a hospital on the grounds that the plaintiffs claim arose out of the peer
review process itself, not an independent occurrence as in a malpractice action, and that
the strong public interest in enforcement of federal antitrust laws outweighed the hospital's
interest in maintaining confidentiality). These inconsistencies in application of the self-
evaluative privilege have led at least one commentator to criticize the privilege as an "ho-
momorphic" exercise in discretionary protection, with "different and unrelated circum-
stances lead[ing] to the same result." Flanagan, supra note 160, at 576.
181. Dowling, 971 F.2d at 426. Expanding on the criteria set out in Bredice, the Dow-
ling court adopted four criteria:
[F]irst, the information must result from a critical self-analysis undertaken by the
party seeking protection; second, the public must have a strong interest in pre-
serving the free flow of the type of information sought; finally, the information
must be of the type whose flow would be curtailed if discovery were allowed. To
these requirements should be added the general proviso that no document will be
accorded a privilege unless it was prepared with the expectation that it would be
kept confidential, and has in fact been kept confidential.
Id. (citations omitted).
182. See id.
183. 628 F.2d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
184. See id. at 210-11.
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subpoena of duces tecum to compel the production of documents. 185
TRW sought to apply the self-evaluative privilege to avoid the production
of documents created as part of its National Consumer Relations Au-
dit.186 Declining to apply the privilege, the court stated the exception for
government agencies with overwhelming clarity:
"Whatever may be the status of the 'self-evaluative' privilege in
the context of private litigation, courts with apparent uniformity
have refused its application where, as here, the documents in
question have been sought by a governmental agency."' 8
7
The TRW court went on to reason that the self-evaluative privilege was
rooted in protecting the public interest. It further reasoned that where,
as in the case at hand, the government seeks disclosure of documents, the
public interest in expeditious agency investigations outweighs the coun-
tervailing interest in confidential self-analysis. 88 The District of Colum-
bia Circuit thus followed the Second Circuit's decision in United States v.
Noall,'189 a case in which the court held the self-evaluative privilege inap-
plicable in response to an order by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to
provide documents.190 Analogously to the Noall court's focus on the
IRS's broad discretion, the TRW court relied on the broad investigatory
powers that Congress had granted to the FTC.' The TRW court quoted
Noall for the proposition that the court has less discretion to apply the
self-evaluative privilege in situations in which government agencies have
exercised their broad investigatory powers than in the normal course of
185. See id. at 209.
186. See id. at 209-10.
187. Id. at 210. See, e.g., Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898, 907 (8th Cir.
1979) (rejecting self-evaluative privilege as a ground for enjoining exchange of government
contractors' affirmative action reports between the EEOC and the Department of Labor
because the reports were not prepared solely for internal use, and further noting that the
rationale for applying the privilege was not as strong because the documents were dis-
closed only to federal agencies and not to third parties); United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d
123, 126 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating that cases that have found that internal reports were privi-
leged were inapplicable in an action for enforcement of the tax laws because Congress
clearly had delineated the Internal Revenue Service's right to obtain documents); Reyn-
olds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld, 564 F.2d 663, 667 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding self-evaluative
privilege did not protect the Department of Labor's affirmative action reports from disclo-
sure to EEOC, since the reports were not prepared solely for internal use and the regula-
tion requiring the reports placed Reynolds on notice that they would be used in the
administration of civil rights laws).
188. See TRW, 628 F.2d at 210-11.
189. 587 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1978).
190. See id. at 126 (holding that the self-evaluative privilege was inapplicable in the
context of an order from the IRS to produce documents for examination).
191. See TRW, 628 F.2d at 211 (noting that the FTC's broad statutory authority fur-
nished an "independent" reason to refuse to apply the self-evaluative privilege).
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discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where judges have
substantial discretion.
192
2. The Self-Evaluative Privilege and the Environmental Audit
a. Dexter Court Held Exception to Privilege for Government
Inquiries Barred Its Application
Undoubtedly, the exception to the privilege for government inquiries is
the single greatest barrier to a company's ability to rely on the self-evalu-
ative privilege to protect disclosure in environmental audits. This excep-
tion leaves the environmental audit accessible to the government when it
seeks to enforce environmental regulations or impose penalties. Until
1994, this restriction on the use of the privilege resulted in a finding that
the self-evaluative privilege did not apply in the one federal environmen-
tal case that had raised the question. In United States v. Dexter Corp. ,193
the court held that "the 'self-evaluative privilege' does not have 'any ap-
plication in an action brought by the government pursuant to the Clean
Water Act.""' 94 The court based its holding on application of the govern-
ment agency exception to the privilege.' 95
Although the Dexter court recognized that the privilege has been rec-
ognized in a variety of situations where confidentiality is essential to the
free flow of information, which in turn is essential to promote the public
interest,196 it found determinative the cases that have refused to apply the
doctrine when a government agency seeks documents. 197 The court rea-
soned that the self-evaluative privilege is based on promotion of the pub-
lic interest. 98 Thus, once Congress has authorized the government to act
192. See id.
193. 132 F.R.D. 8 (D. Conn. 1990).
194. Id. at 8 (reaffirming its earlier opinion upholding a magistrate judge's opinion and
quoting the magistrate's opinion).
195. See id. at 9.
196. See O'Connor v. Chrysler Corp., 86 F.R.D. 211, 218 (D. Mass. 1980) (holding that
a company's self-critical documents concerning corporate personnel policy were entitled to
the protection of the privilege in order to promote the public interest in fair employment
practices); Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249, 251 (D.D.C. 1970) (holding that
self-evaluative reports by hospital staff were entitled to the privilege in order to further the
unimpeded flow of ideas and advice), affd, 479 F.2d 920 (1973); Richards v. Maine Cent.
R.R., 21 F.R.D. 590, 592 (D. Me. 1957) (holding that a railroad company's investigation of
an accident was entitled to the protection of the privilege due to the public interest in
promoting railroad safety).
197. See Dexter, 132 F.R.D. at 9; Federal Trade Comm'n v. TRW, 628 F.2d 207, 210
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Emerson Elec. Co. v. Schlesinger, 609 F.2d 898, 907 (8th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Noall, 587 F.2d 123,124 (2d Cir. 1978); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Rumsfeld,
564 F.2d 663, 667 (4th Cir. 1977).
198. See Dexter, 132 F.R.D. at 9.
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to enforce the laws, the Dexter court concluded, what Congress has de-
clared to be in the public interest should be the paramount considera-
tion. 99 Accordingly, the court found that, because Congress declared
that the EPA should enforce the Clean Water Act and that application of
the self-evaluative privilege would impede the EPA's ability to enforce
the Clean Water Act, the self-evaluative privilege should not apply.2 °°
b. What Room Is Left for Application of the Privilege Outside the
Government Investigation Context?
There may be several ways for a company seeking protection for an
environmental audit to circumvent the TRW and Dexter decisions in the
context of civil litigation, however. Obviously, private party actions can
be distinguished on the ground that no government enforcement is in-
volved. Relying on TRW's reasoning that there is more leeway for the
courts to apply the privilege in civil litigation under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure than in a government investigation,2"' even defendants in
civil liability cases where the government is the plaintiff may be able to
invoke the privilege. Such parties may argue that the reasoning of TRW
is inapplicable because the question of privilege arose in the normal
course of discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rather
than in an agency effort to investigate and thereby enforce regulations.
Moreover, in cases involving sites that have discontinued operations pos-
ing a danger to the surrounding community, a defendant could argue that
the public interest in allowing corporations as a whole to confidentially
review and remediate their environmental problems outweighs the public
interest in allowing the government to prosecute all environmental liabil-
ity claims expeditiously.20 2
These possibilities for the recognition of the self-evaluative privilege
are raised in Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Textron, Inc. 20 3 Here the court
held that a private plaintiff's retrospective analysis of past environmental
practices for the purpose of frank self-evaluation and analysis of the
199. See id.
200. See id. at 9-10.
201. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
202. At least one commentator has criticized Dexter's deference to government agen-
cies as going too far in delegating a judicial function to the legislative branch. See O'Reilly,
supra note 2, at 149. In light of the judicial support for a government agency exception to
the self-evaluative privilege and the extensive delegation to EPA under the federal envi-
ronmental statutes, it is unlikely that an attack on Dexter arguing an unlawful delegation
theory would have much success. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1994) (delegating broad authority to
EPA for remedy selection).
203. 157 F.R.D. 522, 526 (N.D. Fla. 1994).
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source and effect of prior pollution, as well as for analysis of plaintiffs
possible role in the pollution, was privileged.
204
In 1984, plaintiff Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. (Reichhold) entered into a
Consent Order with the Florida Department of Environmental Regula-
tion obligating Reichhold to undertake a variety of measures to investi-
gate and remediate contamination of groundwater and storm water
runoff from its industrial plant site in Pensacola, Florida.215 Subse-
quently, in 1992, Reichhold brought suit against eight defendants, several
of whom were former owners of some portion of the site, to recover the
costs incurred and anticipated in responding to the Consent Order.20 6
Reichhold made claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 20 7 various Florida
statutes, and common-law theories of liability.20 8
The issue of self-evaluative privilege arose when, in a 1993 document
production, Reichhold listed on its privilege log thirteen documents that
it asserted were protected from disclosure solely on the basis of self-criti-
cal analysis.20 9 Reichhold moved for a protective order that the defend-
ants opposed on two grounds.210 First, the defendants urged the court to
decline adoption of a self-evaluative privilege.211 Second, they argued
that even if the privilege did apply to the federal claims, it should not be
extended to state law claims because Florida had not recognized the self-
evaluative privilege by statute or in its state courts.212
After an in camera review of the documents in question, the court
ruled that the self-evaluative privilege would apply to protect six of
Reichhold's documents.213 Ruling that the self-evaluative privilege ap-
plied as a matter of federal privilege law, the court also extended the
privilege for purposes of the pendent state claims, following a number of
federal courts that had held that federal privilege law governs the entire
204. See id. at 527.
205. See id. at 524.
206. See id.
207. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(f) (liability and contribution provisions
respectively).
208. See Reichhold, 157 F.R.D. at 524.
209. See id. The court noted that additional documents were listed as protected by the
self-critical analysis privilege, but also by the more traditional attorney-client and work-
product privileges. See id. at 524 n.1.
210. See id. at 524.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 528.
1997]
Catholic University Law Review
case in a federal question case with pendent state claims,214 and agreeing
that to allow the defendant to obtain discovery for purposes of prosecut-
ing some claims but not others was "'unworkable.' ,215
As its basis for recognizing the self-evaluative privilege, the court ob-
served that the privilege's purpose is to protect parties from the "Hob-
son's choice" between evaluating and correcting actual and potential
environmental problems, and "thereby creating a self-incriminating rec-
ord that may be evidence of liability" or intentionally refraining from cre-
ating a record and "possibly leaving the public exposed to danger.,
216
The court compared the self-critical analysis privilege to Federal Rule of
Evidence 407, which excludes evidence of subsequent remedial measures
based on similar reasons of public policy.
2 17
Applying these principles, the court looked to the decision of the for-
mer Fifth Circuit in Southern Pacific Railway Co. v. Lanham21 8 as prece-
dent for adopting a self-evaluative privilege. 219 The Reichhold court
found that while the former Fifth Circuit had not recognized the self-
evaluative privilege by name, its ruling that retrospective investigations of
railroad accidents were immune from discovery on public policy grounds
was not distinguishable from the self-critical analysis privilege that other
courts later recognized.22 °
After recognizing the limits some courts placed on the privilege and the
fact that some courts refused to recognize the privilege at all, the Reich-
hold court concluded that the public interest in "candid" assessment of
compliance with environmental laws by corporations outweighed private
litigants' interests in discovering this "highly prejudicial, but minimally
relevant evidence. '221 Thus, the court held that retrospective self-assess-
214. See id. Indeed, the Reichhold court observed that the five circuit courts of appeal
who had addressed the issue and a large number of trial courts had reached that conclu-
sion. See id. (citing caselaw).
215. Id. (quoting William T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 671 F.2d 100,
104 (3d Cir. 1982)). In addition, the court noted that, despite the defendants' argument
that a self-evaluative privilege was not available as a matter of law, it was not clear that the
Florida state courts would not recognize the privilege. See id. The court observed that,
although Florida courts cannot adopt new privileges by judicial decision, the Florida courts
had adopted Bredice "not as a rule of privilege, but as a discretionary right of a court on
grounds of public policy." Id. (citing caselaw).
216. Id. at 524.
217. See id.
218. 403 F.2d 119, 131 (5th Cir. 1968).
219. See Reichhold, 157 F.R.D. at 525.
220. See id.
221. Id. at 526.
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ment of compliance with environmental regulations "should be privileged
in appropriate cases."
222
The Reichhold court, however, distinguished application of the privi-
lege for post-accident retrospective analysis from the case where an actor
prospectively investigated and, having actual prior knowledge of a risk of
harm, deliberately chose not to act. 23 The court thus concluded that the
public interest only favors privilege protection of retrospective analy-
sis.224 Despite this limitation in the only case to recognize an environ-
mental audit privilege in the federal courts, an argument could still be
made, based on most of the reasoning in Reichhold, that privilege should
extend to prospective investigation if the company shows during in cam-
era review that adequate efforts were made promptly to correct any non-
compliance discovered. The policy reasons for such a position are
evidenced by the inclusion of similar provisions in many of the state envi-
ronmental audit privilege statutes.225
222. Id.
223. See id. at 527.
224. See id.
225. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. In Koppers Co. v. Aetna Cas. and
Sur. Co., 847 F. Supp. 360 (W.D. Pa.), vacated, 40 F.3d 1240 (3d Cir. 1994), a decision with
limited precedential value in light of its subsequent history, but distinguished in Reichhold,
the court declined to extend privilege protection to preoccurrence reports in the context of
a suit by insureds seeking coverage from insurers for environmental liability. See id. at 364.
Although the Reichhold court focused on the fact that preoccurrence reports were in-
volved to distinguish Koppers, the Koppers court made the much broader ruling that "the
self-evaluation privilege does not apply a fortiori to environmental reports, records, and
memoranda," and disagreed that a corporation would face a Hobson's choice between due
diligence and self-incrimination. Id. The Koppers court's reasoning, however, appears to
be based on a theory that all environmental violations are intentional and knowing. The
situation in which a privilege for self-evaluative audits is valuable occurs when incentives
are needed to encourage investigations to determine if any inadvertent violations, or viola-
tions not known to management, are lurking. When an environmental audit privilege is
considered in the latter context-the more common context for the environmental audit
privilege to be at issue-the Koppers court's first reasoning is inapplicable. See O'Reilly,
supra note 2, at 122 (noting that "a 'failure' found in an audit is less likely to be an illegal
dumping, and more likely to be the result of the complexity of today's paper-laden compli-
ance standards").
As a second basis for its ruling in its rather limited analysis of the self-evaluative privi-
lege, the Koppers court stated that the " 'public need for disclosure of documents relating
to environmental pollution and the circumstances of such pollution outweighs the public's
need for confidentiality in such documents.' " Koppers, 847 F. Supp. at 364-65 (quoting
CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 620 A.2d 462 (1992)). With this
approach, the court focused only on the need for protection of the public from pollution,
but did not consider the possibly more beneficial, but indirect, effect of promoting self-
evaluation through protection of audit confidentiality, thereby possibly encouraging
greater self-policing by industry.
19971
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c. How to Maximize the Chance That an Environmental Audit
Will Be Protected
Reichhold provides some arguments for a self-evaluative privilege, but
the trend of authority indicates a likelihood that courts may find that any
given case is one of many circumstances where the self-evaluative privi-
lege, if any exists, is not applicable.226 In order for the self-evaluative
privilege to be an effective tool to carry out its policy goal of encouraging
companies to invest time and effort in performing audits, it must become
a predictable privilege that companies can count on to protect them from
the risk that environmental audits could later be disclosed in litigation.227
In the meantime, the body of law surrounding the privilege has devel-
oped enough that if a company finds its audit materials potentially at is-
sue in litigation, it makes sense to assert the privilege, although there is
certainly no guarantee of success. Several steps are recommended for
companies to increase the likelihood that an audit will be protected:
[Ensure that all audit material] 1) is prepared with an eye to-
ward furthering the public interest and with a statement regard-
ing the company's environmental policy, 2) conforms with and
advances internal corporate policy, as well as applicable federal,
state and local laws, 3) is held strictly confidential, 4) is written
to reflect the internal, self-evaluation and self-analytical nature
of the process, and 5) is prepared so that the factual and evalua-
tion portions can be separated.228
These steps are aimed at furthering the policy underlying the self-evalua-
tive privilege of encouraging candid and critical self-analysis that in turn
furthers correction of a situation that could prove dangerous to the
public.
IV. THE EPA's POLICY
In stark contrast to the privilege expansion recognized by state legisla-
tures and developing in the federal courts, in a Final Policy signed on
December 18, 1995, and effective January 22, 1996, the EPA confirmed
226. The uncertainty of the privilege's applicability has been illustrated in the securities
law arena. For example, in 1992, a judge in the Southern District of New York rejected the
privilege. See In re Salomon Sec. Litig., [1992-1993 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97, 254 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 12, 1992). In the same year, a judge in the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York applied the privilege. See In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197,
205-06 (E.D.N.Y. 1992).
227. See Joseph E. Murphy & Roselee M. Oyer, Securities Litigation: The Self-Evalua-
tive Privilege & Beyond, INSIGHTS, Mar. 11, 1993, at 11, 12.
228. See Kris & Vannelli, supra note 173, at 249 (citing Frost & Siegel, supra note 173).
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that it would not recognize a privilege for environmental audits.22 9 The
agency stated that it "firmly opposed" a statutory environmental audit
privilege because " [p]rivilege, by definition, invites secrecy, instead of
the openness needed to build public trust in industry's ability to self-po-
lice."23 The EPA further reasoned that no privilege is necessary because
the agency rarely uses audit reports as evidence and because surveys
demonstrate that more companies now are auditing without the need for
the "stimulus" of a privilege.23' Finally, the EPA expressed concern that
a privilege would "invite" industry defendants to claim the privilege with
respect to nearly any evidence the government needed to establish viola-
tions, ultimately breeding more litigation to determine the scope of the
privilege.232
Although the EPA declined to recognize a privilege, it did recognize
the value of audits in uncovering environmental problems.233 Accord-
ingly, the agency's policy recognizes the need to provide some benefit or
encouragement to companies who "self-police" by establishing criteria
for the EPA to reduce or eliminate punitive civil fines and criminal prose-
cutions if violations uncovered in an audit are voluntarily reported and
229. See EPA Final Policy, supra note 2, at 66,710. The EPA confirmed the view it
initially expressed in an interim policy issued on April 3, 1995. See Voluntary Environmen-
tal Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 16,875, 16,878
(1986).
230. EPA Final Policy, supra note 2, at 66,710.
231. See id. The EPA cites a 1995 Price-Waterhouse survey as indicating that industry
respondents who did not conduct environmental audits ranked confidentiality as one of the
least important factors in their decisions. See id. at 66,707.
232. See id. at 67,710.
233. See id. at 66,706. In 1986, the EPA announced its intention to encourage voluntary
environmental audits and to refrain from routinely requesting environmental audit reports,
after initial consideration of requiring mandatory auditing programs and certification of
compliance through external auditors. See Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51
Fed. Reg. 25,004, 25,007 (1986). It was not always clear, however, that the EPA would
approve the present path of voluntary audits free from heavy regulation that currently
exists and precipitates the privilege issue. Indeed, the EPA's policy is entitled "Incentives
for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations," and is
described as a "policy to enhance protection of human health and the environment by
encouraging regulated entities to voluntarily discover and disclose and correct violations of
environmental requirements." EPA Final Policy, supra note 2, at 66,706.
The EPA's Final Policy on self-policing was the culmination of an approximately eight-
een-month period during which the agency evaluated the need for incentives to encourage
voluntary disclosure and correction of violations discovered through environmental audits.
See id. During a two-day public meeting held in July, 1994, the EPA considered testimony
of interested parties, including industry representatives, state environmental enforcement
officials, and professional environmental auditors. See id. The agency also examined other
federal and state policies on auditing and self-policing. See id. It then announced an in-
terim policy on which comments were accepted and reviewed. See id.
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promptly corrected.234 Specifically, in section D, the EPA's policy states
that where violations are found through voluntary environmental "audits
or compliance management systems that demonstrate due diligence," and
where the violations "are promptly disclosed and expeditiously corrected,
the agency will not seek punitive penalties and will generally not recom-
mend criminal prosecution against the regulated entity. '235
Despite section D's guidelines for penalty reduction, the policy pro-
vides that the EPA will seek fines designed to offset any economic benefit
gained from violations.236 The EPA also endeavors to avoid abuse of the
234. See EPA Final Policy, supra note 2, at 66,706.
235. Id. at 66,707, 66,711. Additionally, the EPA's Final Policy provides for reducing
gravity-based penalties by 75% for violations that are voluntarily and promptly disclosed
and corrected, regardless of whether such violations were identified through formal audits
or due diligence constituting a systematic compliance program. See id. at 66,707. Gravity
based penalties are defined in section B of the policy as the punitive portion of the penalty
that is over and above penalties representing a defendant's economic gain from non-com-
pliance. See id. at 66,711. Section D of the Statement of Policy specifically lists the re-
quirements for qualifying for penalty reductions as including nine elements: (1) Systematic
discovery through an environmental audit or an objective, documented, auditing procedure
reflecting the entity's regular practice of due diligence; (2) Voluntary discovery, rather than
discovery through monitoring or sampling required by regulations; (3) Prompt disclosure
within ten days after discovery of the violation or less if provided for by a specific law; (4)
Discovery and disclosure made independently of and prior to any investigation by the gov-
ernment or a third party plaintiff; (5) Correction and remediation of the violation within
sixty days, unless notice is given to EPA within sixty days that a longer time is needed; (6)
Agreement in writing that the regulated entity will take steps to prevent reoccurrence,
which may include improvement of its auditing system; (7) No previous violations of the
same specific nature or closely related violations occurring within three prior years at the
same facility, and no pattern of violations by the facility's parent organization within the
past five years; (8) Violations that resulted in serious actual harm, that present an immi-
nent or substantial danger to human health or the environment, or that violated the terms
of a judicial order, an administrative order, or a consent decree are excluded; (9) Coopera-
tion by the regulated entity as EPA dictates and deems necessary to determine applicabil-
ity of penalty reduction, including providing documents and access to employees. See id. at
66,711-66,712. Penalty reduction, but not elimination, is available if an entity satisfies
items two through nine, but does not satisfy the first requirement of a systematic program
of compliance. See id. at 66,707, 66,711. In addition to the penalty reduction provided in
the Final Policy, the EPA also provided for further penalty reductions for small businesses,
of 100 or fewer employees, as part of its small business compliance policy. That policy
provides that no gravity-based penalties will be assessed against small businesses if there is
compliance with four criteria: (1) the company must demonstrate good faith effort to be in
compliance by receiving on-site compliance assistance or by undertaking a voluntary self-
audit, (2) the company must have no prior violations of the requirement at issue, (3) the
violation must be corrected in 180 days, and (4) the violation must not represent criminal
misconduct or present an imminent or substantiated endangerment to human health or the
environment. See EPA Expands Small Business Compliance Policy to Cover Self-Audits, 17
Inside EPA Wkly. Rep., No. 22, at 6-7 (May 31, 1996).
236. See EPA Final Policy, supra note 2, at 66,707, 66,712. EPA expressed two reasons
for retaining the right to recover economic benefits: "[first], it provides an incentive to
comply on time ... [and] [s]econd ... it protects responsible companies from being under-
[Vol. 46:325
An Environmental Audit Privilege
voluntary disclosure mechanism by providing that "[r]epeated violations
or those which result in actual harm or may present imminent and sub-
stantial endangerment are not eligible for relief. '2 37 Additionally, crin-
nal liability for conscious disregard of legal obligations remains in place,
with the EPA emphasizing that its penalty reductions are "limited to good
actors. ,
2 3 8
In response to concerns that audits may be used unfairly in environ-
mental enforcement, the agency stated that it will not routinely request
audit reports from companies. 239 Rather, the EPA affirmed that, as a
rule, it will not recommend criminal prosecution of a company or individ-
ual who voluntarily has disclosed noncompliance or violations discovered
through an audit, so long as the regulated entity made the disclosures
before the government initiated an investigation.240 Thus, the EPA as-
serts that it will not recommend criminal prosecution if a regulated entity
''uncovers violations through environmental audits or due diligence,
promptly discloses and expeditiously corrects those violations, and meets
all other conditions of Section D of the policy."'241 If, however, the EPA
has "independent evidence of a violation" it may request further informa-
tion in order to establish the "extent and nature of the problem and the
degree of culpability.
242
Like several states that have imposed temporal limits on their environ-
mental audit statutes, the EPA recognized that experience will be the best
test of its policy, and plans to conduct a study within three years of pro-
mulgation of this policy to determine its effectiveness.243
A. Effect on State Audit Privilege Laws
1. EPA's Position as Expressed in Its Final Policy
In its Final Policy, the EPA encouraged states to experiment with dif-
ferent methods of ensuring environmental compliance, but cautioned that
state efforts should not "jeopardize the fundamental national interest in
assuring that violations of federal law do not threaten the public health or
cut by their noncomplying competitors." Id. at 66,707. The policy, however, does not set
forth standards for measuring such economic benefits.
237. Id. at 66,706. Thus, in accordance with this purpose of not permitting promotion
of audits to interfere with clean-up of the environment, the policy does not affect calcula-
tion of cleanup costs, remedial costs, natural resource damages, or emergency response
costs associated with a violation.




242. Id. at 66,708.
243. See id. at 66,712.
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the environment, or make it profitable not to comply."'2 "4 Warning that
states with audit privilege laws may not meet this requirement, the agency
"reserve[d] its right to bring independent action against regulated entities
for violations of federal law that threaten human health or the environ-
ment, reflect criminal conduct or repeated noncompliance, or allow one
company to make a substantial profit at the expense of its law-abiding
competitors., 245 Thus, state statutes creating an environmental audit
privilege may not protect companies in all cases, such as when the EPA
finds that a state statute frustrates federal environmental policy.
2. EPA Actions Since the Final Policy Opposing Existing State
Legislation
Since its Final Policy became effective, the EPA's concern that state
audit privilege and penalty immunity laws not impede enforcement of
federal environmental laws has led to controversy involving the federal
environmental statutes' delegation of authority to states that have en-
acted audit protection laws. Most notably, the issue has come to the
forefront in Idaho where EPA Region X announced a decision on Octo-
ber 27, 1995, which cited Idaho's state immunity law as a reason for re-
jecting the state's air operating permit program.246 Following the Region
X announcement, a number of EPA regional offices revisited their deci-
sions to approve Clean Air Act operating permit programs in states with
strong audit protection laws.247
Region X's concern, specifically, was that the state law, providing state
immunity from civil or criminal liability for violations voluntarily dis-
closed by the source to the state, "would 'impermissibly interfere with
Idaho's enforcement requirements.' ",248 In this context, the EPA condi-
tioned final approval on the state "either changing its immunity law or
demonstrating why the program would not undercut the state's enforce-
ment authority." 49 Although the EPA ultimately approved the state per-
mit programs on an interim basis and deferred the audit privilege and
immunity law issue until it could be considered during final program ap-
244. Id. at 66,710.
245. Id.
246. See EPA Considers Blocking Air Permit Delegation to States with Audit Laws, 17
Inside EPA Wkly. Rep., No. 11, at 6 (Mar. 15, 1996).
247. See id.
248. Id. (quoting statements of the EPA Region X spokesperson).
249. Id.
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proval, the agency has continued to oppose the breadth of the Idaho
law.2
50
For example, the EPA published a memorandum establishing criteria
for approvals under Title V of the Clean Air Act, aimed at clarifying the
circumstances under which state audit immunity and privilege laws would
deprive a state of the authority to implement operating permit programs
under Title V.25 1 The EPA's guidance document indicates that responsi-
bility can still be delegated to states with audit privilege and immunity
laws, provided that the EPA determines that the state's permit program
meets minimum federal standards and provides guidelines for such deter-
mination to be made on a case-by-case basis in light of the wide variation
of state statutes. 252 Accordingly, the possibility remains that the EPA
will remove state authority and control in administrating federal statutes
if it is sufficiently concerned that the breadth of a state's environmental
audit law will impede the state's enforcement capabilities.
3. EPA Efforts to Discourage Additional State Legislation
Since enactment of the Final Policy, the EPA also has discouraged en-
actment of environmental audit protection laws in other states. For ex-
ample, when New Hampshire's aggressive environmental audit privilege
bill was in the final stages of the legislative process, the EPA's Region I
Administrator sent a letter to New Hampshire's governor expressing the
agency's opposition and requesting that the state amend the legislation so
that it would not "apply to federally delegated programs with more strin-
gent federal requirements., 253 Similarly, the EPA notified Virginia that
there would be increased federal enforcement in the state if Virginia con-
strained enforcement efforts with its proposed audit privilege and penalty
immunity statute.254 This instance of EPA intimidation of the states oc-
curred before the agency's policy became final.
250. See EPA to Approve 'Interim' Permit Programs Despite Audit Privilege Laws, 17
Inside EPA Wkly. Rep., No. 14, at 1, 6 (Apr. 5, 1996).
251. See EPA Memo Establishing Criteria for Title V Approvals, 17 Inside EPA Wkly.
Rep., No. 15, at 5 (Apr. 12, 1996).
252. See id.
253. EPA Considers Blocking Air Permit Delegation to States With Audit Laws, supra
note 246, at 6. The air operating permit program under Title V of the Clean Air Act has
become the focus of EPA's interest in this area because it is the only major media program
that has not already been broadly delegated to the states. See id.
254. Broderick, supra note 11, at 810-11 (reporting comments of state lawmakers'
group).
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4. Impact of EPA Efforts to Discourage Privilege Expansion
The EPA Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and Compliance
Assistance, Steven Herman, has expressed the view that the EPA's Final
Policy has "'stopped the steamroller"' of state privilege legislation and
placed in check the tendency in the states toward adopting privilege legis-
lation.255 Nonetheless, in the months after the EPA's Final Policy became
effective, several states, including New Hampshire, enacted laws that pro-
vide an environmental audit privilege and/or some form of penalty immu-
nity for violations discovered through an audit and voluntarily
disclosed.256
California, however, has acted largely in line with the EPA's position,
responding to the agency's policy on environmental audits and voluntary
disclosure of violations with a draft policy that expanded and clarified the
federal policy.257 California's draft policy lists the same conditions as the
federal policy that a regulated entity must meet to gain a reduction or
total elimination of penalties.258 Expansions in the California policy,
however, include a further penalty reduction for investments in pollution
prevention programs, as well as more willingness to offer penalty reduc-
tions for violations voluntarily revealed.259 California's policy is in at
least one respect potentially more stringent than the federal policy: it has
expanded the categories of cases in which the agency reserves its right to
refer the case for criminal prosecution.26 ° Under the EPA's policy, cases
can be referred for criminal prosecution where " 'high-level corporate of-
ficials or managers were consciously involved or willfully blind to the vio-
lations,' "261 whereas under California's policy, the right to refer cases for
255. See Hogue, supra note 8, at 573-74 (quoting remarks of Steven Herman). Another
source reports that in 1995, while EPA was receiving comments on its audit policy, seven
states considered and rejected audit privilege statutes, including Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa,
Maryland, Missouri, Montana, and West Virginia. See Cheryl Hogue & Kurt Fernandez,
Number of States With Laws Granting Audit Privilege Grows to 14 With Texas, 19 Chem.
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 236 (June 2, 1995).
256. See 1996 N.H. Adv. Legis. Serv. 10, 12, 14-15 (Michie) (to be codified at N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 147-E:3, 147-E:9).
257. See California Unveils Draft Policy that Expands on EPA Audit Approach, 19
Chem. Reg. Rptr. (BNA) No. 46, at 1351 (Feb. 23, 1996).
258. See id. Like the federal EPA, California's EPA will reduce or eliminate penalties
where the violation is the result of an environmental audit or other objective, documented,
organized procedure or practice reflecting the facility's due diligence; the violation is iden-
tifled voluntarily and promptly disclosed; and the violation is corrected as soon as possible
and steps are taken to prevent reoccurrence. See id.
259. See id. (citing comments of Gerald G. Johnson, California EPA counsel and assis-
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prosecution to is extended to situations in which" 'a management philos-
ophy or practice ... concealed or condoned the violation.' "262
B. Impact on the Burgeoning Self-Evaluative Privilege
The impact of the EPA's Final Policy on the judicial development of a
self-evaluative privilege has yet to be demonstrated in the courts. It is
quite possible that courts will look to EPA's policy in deciding whether a
self-evaluative privilege should apply in the environmental context. The
Final Policy's report of the EPA's reasons for its position, however, pro-
vides room for challenge to the policy reasons for not recognizing a
privilege.
For example, in support of its opposition of a statutory evidentiary
privilege for environmental audits, the EPA argued that privilege invites
secrecy "instead of the openness needed to build public trust in industry's
ability to self-police, 263 thus concluding that in the environmental con-
text, a self-evaluative privilege would be contrary to, rather than in fur-
therance of, public policy. The EPA also argues that statistics show audit
protection laws will not accomplish their intended goal of encouraging
more environmental audits. The EPA relies on a 1995 Price Waterhouse
survey that found "those few large or mid-sized companies that do not
audit generally do not perceive any need to; concern about confidentiality
ranked as one of the least important factors in their decisions. '2 64 Those
seeking to assert a self-evaluative privilege could attack the EPA's rea-
soning, however, with statistics countering the Price-Waterhouse survey
on which the agency relies to establish that audit protection does in fact
further voluntary compliance.
An additional factor that might persuade a court to disregard the
agency's position is that the agency does not give a complete picture of
the development of the self-evaluative privilege in the courts. The EPA
cites Dexter, the only reported decision on the subject of the self-evalua-
tive privilege in a suit by the government, for the proposition that
"[flederal courts have unanimously refused to recognize a privilege for
environmental audits in the context of government investigations.
2 65
The EPA, however, does not mention the very recent growth of a privi-
262. Id.
263. EPA Final Policy, supra note 2, at 66,710 (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974), for the proposition that because "they are in derogation of the search for
truth," privileges should not be created lightly).
264. Id.
265. Id. (citing United States v. Dexter, 132 F.R.D. 8 (D. Conn. 1990)); see supra notes
193-200 and accompanying text (discussing Dexter in detail).
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lege's recognition in Reichhold and does not mention that court's ap-
proach to the privilege in the civil litigation context.
266
Finally, even if the EPA's position discourages growth of a self-evalua-
tive privilege in the courts, it expressly states only that it does not advo-
cate creation of a statutory evidentiary privilege for environmental
audits, not that its position in any way impacts existing common-law priv-
ileges. Accordingly, the agency arguably has left room for recognition of
a self-evaluative privilege in the courts and clearly has left intact the
availability of attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine to
protect environmental audits where there is adequate attorney
involvement.
V. CONCLUSION
The EPA's Final Policy opposing privilege expansion may have slowed
the trend of privilege expansion, but it has by no means entirely stopped
the wave. Although cases have not arisen in which courts have expanded
the self-evaluative privilege for environmental audit materials in the re-
cent months since the EPA announced its Final Policy, the policy by no
means precludes expansion of common-law privilege to protect audit
materials in the courts. Moreover, the legislative initiative continues to
thrive, by all accounts, with bills still under consideration in Congress and
some states already having enacted broad privilege protection and pen-
alty immunity for environmental audits since the EPA's announcement of
its Final Policy.
Nonetheless, privilege protection for environmental audits remains the
exception to the rule, and, unless a federal law is enacted to spread uni-
formity, it will be years before environmental audit protection is broad
enough to guarantee confidentiality in every forum-the circumstance
needed to maximize the possibility of accomplishing the goal behind au-
dit protection of achieving voluntary compliance through routine self-
evaluation.
266. See supra notes 203-25 and accompanying text (discussing Reichhold in detail).
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